I recently attended the FICCI- Frames 2006 conference of the Indian Media and Entertainment Industry conducted by FICCI. The conference is essentially an annual event for the Industry, the biggest of its kind in Asia and I was amazed to see the attendance of more than 1500 people and above all the high level of enthusiasm, interest and novation.
The tone of the conference was overly positive and optimistic. It was creativity (Animation, Gaming) and technology (DBTV, IPTV, Mobisodes, Digitalization) that was what picked attention and focus.
Quick ideas/thoughts from the 3 day event:
IP (Internet protocol)+IP (intellectual property) is the winning equation
Mobile: to be used voice also. The sixth sense, the extended limb blah blah. Mobile to mean a lot many things for lot many people – MP3, video recorder, camera, gaming console , PDA , Mini TV.
Gaming and Animation: The next big thing. Not necessarily outsourcing of animation but our own proprietary content(IP).
E-content, Mobile content is in: Nazara technologies, Mauj telecom, makemytrip.com contest2win.com, exchange4media.com or yatra online is in. Key to success superior execution ability, history of failure (and having learnt from them) and revenue model in place with ability to charge clients. Do not expect the Indian consumer as of now to pay for online content.
Print is out: A business for passion not necessarily earning money. High print costs and extreme competition from other media of advertising to keep scope of growth limited.
Radio, Multiplexes: Need to specialize, Differentiate and engage consumers.
Both radio and multiplexes have little or no brand preference among consumers, very commodity kind of play. Need to get out from the frame of mind to mean everything for everybody. All Radios cannot play Hindi/Pop music.
Also, All multiplexes cannot just keep showing whatever movies are released. Case in point is Sathyam cinemas in Chennai showing digital cinema whereas the best multiplex in Mumbai still laggards.
Television: Need to get ready for time shifting and space shifting
Television in the future will not necessarily be watched as per the Broadcasters wish but with IPTV and TiVO kind of applications to give choice to the consumer. Concept of prime time viewing may die down. Television may not necessarily watched on Television sets they will be watched on all other screens like Mobiles, computers, Ipods etc. Interactive Tv is not going to be limited to SMSing. Intel and Microsoft TV where the frontrunners in showcasing their Time shifting solutions.
Thursday, March 30, 2006
Wednesday, March 29, 2006
ADAM SMITH THE MONEY GAME
Few interesting excerpts from the book:
We are all at a wonderful party, and by the rules of the game we know at some point in time the Black horsemen will burst through the great terrace doors to cut down the revelers; those who leave early may be saved, but the music and wines are so seductive that we do not want to leave, but we do ask, “What time is it? What time is it?” Only none of the clock have any hands.
The irony is that this is the money game and money is the way we keep score. But the real object of the game is not money; it is playing of the game itself. For the true players, you could take all the trophies away and substitute plastic heads or Whale’s teeth; as long as there is a way to keep score, they will play.
If you do not know who you are, this is an expensive place to find out.
You can have no preconceived ideas. There are fundamentals in the market place, but the unexplored area is the emotional one. All the charts and breadth indicators and technicals are the statisticians attempt to describe an emotional state.
Sunday, March 05, 2006
Herding Behavior: Failing Conventionally
Failing conventionally is the route to go. As a group, Lemmings may have a rotten image, but no individual Lemming has ever received a bad press.
-Cialdini
Reputation is at stake…underperformance is easily measured, instantaneously available, and highly visible. The ease with which a fund manager can imagine getting sacked for this crime inclines him towards decisions that can be most easily defended after the fact. As ever, failing conventionally is the way to go.
The greater the ambiguity – as with technology stocks, for instance- the greater the likelihood that social influence will dictate behavior. Instead of focusing on what businesses will do in the years ahead, many prestigious money managers now focus on what they expect other money managers to do in the days ahead.
Besides, the market may actually be right; it is efficient. Perhaps other people know something I don’t?
- Excerpts from the book “The Real Warren Buffet: Managing Capital, Leading People”
Money has been pouring into Indian stock markets and the Indian indices have been touching new levels every fortnight. While money is being raised from Japan (with real negative to zero interest rates) and petro dollars flowing in from the middle-east, money managers are finding it difficult to invest. Also the domestic retail money is flowing in the stock markets, with new offerings from Mutual funds garnering huge interest. The domestic investment in equity is relatively low at 2-3% of savings, living a lot of scope of domestic liquidity even if FII flows dry out or channeled into cheaper emerging markets.
What needs to be highlighted in the Indian context is the lack of investble listed paper, which is pushing the prices of the good paper to record levels. The recent sops in the Indian budget to MF industry might have enhanced the investment opportunity but it is still not sufficient.
What needs to be done is to provide avenues to absorb the excess liquidity into India is:
Till then, it is the Private Equity investors who will rule- having more breadth for investing. Where as the Mutual fund managers will exhibit Lemmings like behavior and continue to invest in the Large caps and companies of repute ignoring valuations – as nobody will reprimand you for investing in Tata’s, Birla’s, Bharti’s, Infosys , SBI etc for Perhaps the Markets-may-actually-be-right.
So it is highly unlikely that Money mangers are now going to sit on cash , as he may be reprimanded for - missing the Bus or not having the Visionary insight of “how the Indian demography is changing”. However, the blame of low returns or negative returns could easily be attributed – “everybody is losing money” or “the markets are moving down”.
-Cialdini
Reputation is at stake…underperformance is easily measured, instantaneously available, and highly visible. The ease with which a fund manager can imagine getting sacked for this crime inclines him towards decisions that can be most easily defended after the fact. As ever, failing conventionally is the way to go.
The greater the ambiguity – as with technology stocks, for instance- the greater the likelihood that social influence will dictate behavior. Instead of focusing on what businesses will do in the years ahead, many prestigious money managers now focus on what they expect other money managers to do in the days ahead.
Besides, the market may actually be right; it is efficient. Perhaps other people know something I don’t?
- Excerpts from the book “The Real Warren Buffet: Managing Capital, Leading People”
Money has been pouring into Indian stock markets and the Indian indices have been touching new levels every fortnight. While money is being raised from Japan (with real negative to zero interest rates) and petro dollars flowing in from the middle-east, money managers are finding it difficult to invest. Also the domestic retail money is flowing in the stock markets, with new offerings from Mutual funds garnering huge interest. The domestic investment in equity is relatively low at 2-3% of savings, living a lot of scope of domestic liquidity even if FII flows dry out or channeled into cheaper emerging markets.
What needs to be highlighted in the Indian context is the lack of investble listed paper, which is pushing the prices of the good paper to record levels. The recent sops in the Indian budget to MF industry might have enhanced the investment opportunity but it is still not sufficient.
What needs to be done is to provide avenues to absorb the excess liquidity into India is:
- More paper- some big ticket IPOs :Airlines (Deccan, Kingfisher, Spicejet – they will all be needing funds to expand), Telecom – ( Hutchison, Idea etc)
- Partial or complete Disinvestments – BSNL, LIC etc
- FDI or FII limits enhancement. – Banking, retail, Construction, real estate…
- Increase liquidity in Corporate Debt market & Government securities.
Till then, it is the Private Equity investors who will rule- having more breadth for investing. Where as the Mutual fund managers will exhibit Lemmings like behavior and continue to invest in the Large caps and companies of repute ignoring valuations – as nobody will reprimand you for investing in Tata’s, Birla’s, Bharti’s, Infosys , SBI etc for Perhaps the Markets-may-actually-be-right.
So it is highly unlikely that Money mangers are now going to sit on cash , as he may be reprimanded for - missing the Bus or not having the Visionary insight of “how the Indian demography is changing”. However, the blame of low returns or negative returns could easily be attributed – “everybody is losing money” or “the markets are moving down”.
Sunday, February 26, 2006
Quotes
In god we trust, everybody else brings data to the table. -N R Murthy, Infosys
Meeting the deadlines is not good enough, beating the deadlines is my expectation.
- Dhirubhai Ambani, Reliance
I worry when times are good. – Anand Mahindra, M&M
Ultimately, everyone in the world is going to die, but we must die last.
– Anil Agarwal, Vedanta resources
Tuesday, February 14, 2006
Adventure capitalist: Jim Rogers
Just finished reading Adventure Capitalist by Jim Rogers. Well I picked up the book expecting some tips/fundae on Investing and stuff but it turned out to be more of a travelogue.
But Jim Rogers with his travelogue makes investing a very simple game by talking at very macro level …essentially answering where the country is headed?
Let s see some of the basic questions that will answer which country is headed where?
Median age of Population?
Demographics determine whether the country is heading towards progress or busy feeding his old/tired. Japan is a case in point, where the population is highly skewed to old age, which puts a lot of pressure on the working population. Countries like Ireland and India are to benefit from the young population. USA is to face the same problem with retirement period of baby boomers coming close.
Would like to digress here ………….I am just wondering if the same could be applied to some of the PSUs in India. MTNL is a case in point – relatively old and huge staff mainly being retirement benefits makes it tough for the company. Auto manufacturers in USA (GM) are also suffering from the same. Currently GM is benefiting from the rising interest rates in USA, as it is has maintained the funded status of its retirement benefits.
Corruption and bureaucratic hurdles.
The amount of money/FDI coming into a system/country is inversely proportional; to the levels of corruption and bureaucracy in a country. This in case of Jim Rogers can be measured by the ease of getting a visa and the no of days taken to process.
India scored relatively low in this account with corruption very rampant.
Type of government
By type of government – it does not matter whether the country is a dictatorship or democracy – but by the nature of policies and thinking at the government level. China prospered under the Premier and so did some of the Arabian nations where the Oil barons knew how to use the oil resources. However, countries like Indonesia and Nigeria inspite of rich oil reserves continue to be poorly managed.
Work culture
The Germans restructured themselves twice after being totally devastated by the world wars...each time emerging as a stronger country. The Chinese exist in difficult topography with little to boast about. But they were successful in using their population from a problem to an opportunity of low cost labor. The work ethics of CHINA is what makes it’s growing at 8-10%. Compared to this there are relatively many countries in the Africa endowed with rich deposits of minerals and food stuffs. But the economies are so used to GRANTS from the IMF/world bank that they have stopped working at all.
Well the book is a fascinating reading giving a broad framework to analyzing countries. The frankness with Jim Rogers writes he may get him killed some time – will update you on this Later.
But Jim Rogers with his travelogue makes investing a very simple game by talking at very macro level …essentially answering where the country is headed?
Let s see some of the basic questions that will answer which country is headed where?
Median age of Population?
Demographics determine whether the country is heading towards progress or busy feeding his old/tired. Japan is a case in point, where the population is highly skewed to old age, which puts a lot of pressure on the working population. Countries like Ireland and India are to benefit from the young population. USA is to face the same problem with retirement period of baby boomers coming close.
Would like to digress here ………….I am just wondering if the same could be applied to some of the PSUs in India. MTNL is a case in point – relatively old and huge staff mainly being retirement benefits makes it tough for the company. Auto manufacturers in USA (GM) are also suffering from the same. Currently GM is benefiting from the rising interest rates in USA, as it is has maintained the funded status of its retirement benefits.
Corruption and bureaucratic hurdles.
The amount of money/FDI coming into a system/country is inversely proportional; to the levels of corruption and bureaucracy in a country. This in case of Jim Rogers can be measured by the ease of getting a visa and the no of days taken to process.
India scored relatively low in this account with corruption very rampant.
Type of government
By type of government – it does not matter whether the country is a dictatorship or democracy – but by the nature of policies and thinking at the government level. China prospered under the Premier and so did some of the Arabian nations where the Oil barons knew how to use the oil resources. However, countries like Indonesia and Nigeria inspite of rich oil reserves continue to be poorly managed.
Work culture
The Germans restructured themselves twice after being totally devastated by the world wars...each time emerging as a stronger country. The Chinese exist in difficult topography with little to boast about. But they were successful in using their population from a problem to an opportunity of low cost labor. The work ethics of CHINA is what makes it’s growing at 8-10%. Compared to this there are relatively many countries in the Africa endowed with rich deposits of minerals and food stuffs. But the economies are so used to GRANTS from the IMF/world bank that they have stopped working at all.
Well the book is a fascinating reading giving a broad framework to analyzing countries. The frankness with Jim Rogers writes he may get him killed some time – will update you on this Later.
Monday, February 06, 2006
10K and more...
The Sensex today touched the 10k mark, rising by 237 points. While the Sensex continues to rise to newer levels and achieving higher growth, analysts continue to remain BULLISH on the Indian market. Every positive movement in the Sensex is followed by a host of market/investment guru proclaiming – “I told you so”. Some of the more sophisticated analysts talk about the secular performance of the Indian industry and attribute stuff like Stabilizing politics, conducive policies, liberalization, infra boom, Capex cycle, benign interest/ inflation rates and blah blah…..
Every person who has been bearish on the Indian markets seems to have been proved wrong with the earlier Sensex targets becoming current “strong support” levels. Well I do not blame anybody as I had earlier mentioned its part of their business - be it analysts, fund managers.
The Nifty is currently trading at 18 times trailing earnings as compared to 14 times about 12 months before. Generally a steep rise in EPS is marginally cushioned by a decline in earnings multiple, ensuring a moderate rise in indices. However, currently we see that the while the EPS has risen far above the normal trend line so has the P/E multiples, which is clearly signal of a lot of optimism built in the current share prices, even with interest rates slowly being pushed.
Going by Past indices correction it is very clear that the higher the rise, the harder will be the fall. While the probability of a Harsh Mehta, Ketan Parekh kind of event is rare as the multiples aren’t at alarmingly high levels. However, I probably feel an internal political calamity could cause harm. Anyways returns from the current levels are not going to be great.
So be better be sure of what you are invested into and be ready to hold it for long periods.
Monday, January 30, 2006
Randomness and survivorship Bias
Situation
Think of a situation where you get an email on the First of Jan saying that the markets are going to up this month and they actually go up in the month. Again on the first of next month you receive a mail saying that this month the markets are going to go down and BINGO you notice they go down. This happens consecutively for 6 months, with a right prediction every time.
Your Analysis is that the person sending you the mail must be a top notch analyst who has figured the movements of the market well. On the next month again you receive a mail saying that the markets are going to go up substantially up this month and also with an accompanying brochure of advertisement to invest a small sum of US$ 100 in his fund so that you can benefit from his analysis. You are tempted to do so and you do so.
Result:
The person was a con and he loots you of the money.
How did it all happen? Why would an analyst of repute do that?
The story behind all this is that a mathematician sent out an email the first month of Jan to 64 people, in which for 32 he wrote that the markets are going to go up and for 32 to that the markets are going to go down. Depending on how the markets behaved that month and to the set of people he was right he divided the set into two and to one group he sent the email the markets are going up and to the other the markets are going down. At the end of the six months he had given right set of signals for 6 consecutive months to one person whom he sent out the promotional material.
So actually you were just a victim of survivorship as you were the person who survived the random attempts of the mathematician.
Observation:
We are very observant of success around us and gladly dissect the past of successful person and find a trend in terms of personal qualities, hard work and honesty. What we miss out is the thousands and millions of who had similar qualities and who set out in similar ventures of the likes of Narayan Murthy, Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, Dhirubhai Ambani etc. One probable reason is only successful people right biographies and the history remembers only those who lived or were successful.
“Heroes are Heroes because their actions are Heroic in Nature, not because they won or lost.
{Thoughts adapted from Fooled by Randomness by Taleb}
Saturday, January 14, 2006
Career advice- Buffet
A question to Warren buffet and his reply …so apt
Q: What is your career advice?
A: If you want to make a lot of money go to Wall Street. More importantly though, do what you would do for free, having passion for what you do is the most important thing. I love what I do; I'm not even that busy. I got a total of five phone calls all day yesterday and one of them was a wrong number. Ms. B from NFM had passion, that's why she was successful. A few months ago I was talking to another MBA student, a very talented man, about 30 years old from a great school with a great resume. I asked him what he wanted to do for his career, and he replied that he wanted to go into a particular field, but thought he should work for McKinsey for a few years first to add to his resume.
To me that's like saving sex for your old age. It makes no sense.
Tuesday, January 10, 2006
Understanding Depreciation
Depreciation is a charge on the assets of the company to reflect the loss of assets through wear and tear or obsolescence. While in accounting terms it would simply writing down the value of an asset annually by a fixed percentage generally in line with what the income tax authority’s numbers.
Meaning Depreciate as per Webster: to lower the price or estimated value of
However, what is relevant depreciation is can be clearly defined by economic depreciation…meaning a charge that will provide for the replacement of assets (and the earning power) in place of the current assets. This is the point where accounting and economics start to show a wide gap. While accounting is in favor of charging the book value of an asset with a regular amount, the actual earnings power or cash flow is never taken into account.
Then, what are the implications for company’s accounts whose market value of assets is far higher than what is carried on books. Well the standard argument would be since the value of an asset is the present value of the cash flows that can be generated by the asset, in case the market value of an asset has increased, it would reflect in the cash flows (earnings) of the company.
Let’s assume to scenarios of High asset value:
Asset value is high
For example: A company with a gold mine.
With gold prices spiraling and touching new highs, the company market value of asset would be far higher than what would be reflected in the books. While the increase in value of the asset would be analyzed and reflect in the earning’s and due weightage is likely to be given by the Analysts over a period of time. The immediate appreciation of such a gain due to holding of high quality, high earning assets in Books is frequently ignored. This is mainly due to the trouble of analysts in revaluing the assets and related entries which at the times the market would not appreciate terming it as very aggressive.
This was seen when the carbon credit story played out in the news. While the Carbon credits gave an incrementally high value to the Fixed Assets of some of the companies, analysts took considerable time in appreciating the same. SRF was a case in point.
The lack of clarity of on Pricing of carbon credits, made certain analysts vary of the projections based on assumption and appreciating the true potential. (I have no personal opinion on the carbon credits pricing or any view on how it would span out)
However, one learning that I got on observing this was relatively complex ideas remain under researched and analysts relatively take very conservative (to avoid being completely wrong) opinion and there is a possible of unearthing huge value based on thorough analysis.
A thought: “Equity Analysts estimates of calls on stock would be far more worth if there was no active stock price being quoted in the stock markets. Something that clouds over the mind before sitting on any fair value analysis.
Financial statement analysis will not easily help in finding the actual hidden value of assets. At best hidden value in assets may reflect in lower charge of depreciation in relation to income. Analysts and owners have to maintain their conservative approach and seldom right up assets.
What happens if no adjustment to the asset value and depreciation is made?
Reported Earnings for the year will be reported higher due to a low depreciation charge. Hence all earning ratios (P/E, ROE) would look good but Book value ratios would not look attractive.
Godrej consumer products is a case in point.
The company currently trades 23 times its TTM earnings and 51 times its book Value. The actual value of the asset is in the Brand (something very true with strong franchises). The company’s depreciation is just 8% of its operating profit.
While I generally look at book value business ...in this case it was just not possible as the value of the brand is to be added on to the book value.
However, accounting for appreciation or depreciation of assets does not change the cash flows and any valuation done on the cash flow would hold good.
Sunday, December 18, 2005
Analyzing business - Modeling
Analyzing business - Modeling
The last few days I have been thinking if there is a sense in analyzing and trying to search for stock ideas, when you believe that everything around is so overvalued. Is it not just wise to sit and wait for better investment days to come?
Well, I thought so but now feel corrected.
While my discomfort with current overall valuations continue to remain. There are frequent stories of turnaround and undervalued picks still moving around. While they coming to my notice however looks rare because of the simple denial –“ I have seen them at lower levels and therefore they look overvalued or not worth analyzing”. Or “simply, it’s a con story”.
Well now I believe this is the time to actually track ideas which you liked and find similar picks in similar sectors. For all I need to do is wait for the stock to correct or be available at a lower rate and I can pounce on it, provided I have done my research.
And to do the same I have built upon a simple model to maintain track- based on 10 parameters.
The 10 parameters are:
Profitability
Capital structure
Efficiency:
Insiders view:
All these are business related parameters and a good judge for how the company has been doing. Perhaps at a later day I would like to link these to movement in their respective industry parameters and relate it to valuations.
I have automated the function to bloomberg and would be glad to send such information to anybody who desires. Will keep you updated on the model.
Meanwhile would appreciate if you could comment on the parameters used. While analyzing business, while most parameters look important and there are a host of them, I have knowingly limited the no of parameters- so any additional parameter will essentially be to replace the existing one. A 10-pointer scale is easy to read.
The rating is Binary.
The parameters used are influenced by Piotroski.
The last few days I have been thinking if there is a sense in analyzing and trying to search for stock ideas, when you believe that everything around is so overvalued. Is it not just wise to sit and wait for better investment days to come?
Well, I thought so but now feel corrected.
While my discomfort with current overall valuations continue to remain. There are frequent stories of turnaround and undervalued picks still moving around. While they coming to my notice however looks rare because of the simple denial –“ I have seen them at lower levels and therefore they look overvalued or not worth analyzing”. Or “simply, it’s a con story”.
Well now I believe this is the time to actually track ideas which you liked and find similar picks in similar sectors. For all I need to do is wait for the stock to correct or be available at a lower rate and I can pounce on it, provided I have done my research.
And to do the same I have built upon a simple model to maintain track- based on 10 parameters.
The 10 parameters are:
Profitability
- Growing operating profits
- Growing net income
- Earnings quality = measured by operating cash flow is more than net income.
- Increase in return on assets
Capital structure
- Decreasing debt ratio
- No equity dilution – not more than 5% in a year. Till 5% could be due to some ESOPs
- Increasing net working capital.
Efficiency:
- Improving gross margins- reflects nature of industry and ability to cut down on costs over time.
- Assets turnover
Insiders view:
- Change in promoters stake.
All these are business related parameters and a good judge for how the company has been doing. Perhaps at a later day I would like to link these to movement in their respective industry parameters and relate it to valuations.
I have automated the function to bloomberg and would be glad to send such information to anybody who desires. Will keep you updated on the model.
Meanwhile would appreciate if you could comment on the parameters used. While analyzing business, while most parameters look important and there are a host of them, I have knowingly limited the no of parameters- so any additional parameter will essentially be to replace the existing one. A 10-pointer scale is easy to read.
The rating is Binary.
The parameters used are influenced by Piotroski.
Friday, November 11, 2005
CNBC Talk on NLD ILD license fee cut
My views on NLD/ILD license fee cut: Interview on CNBC
Excerpt of the Interview.
On the same day I mentioned about Carrier access codes to increase competition in the ILD/NLD segment-TRAI has come up with a paper asking the Operators about their readiness for implementing CAC.
TRAI’s letter to service providers - Link
Excerpt of the Interview.
On the same day I mentioned about Carrier access codes to increase competition in the ILD/NLD segment-TRAI has come up with a paper asking the Operators about their readiness for implementing CAC.
TRAI’s letter to service providers - Link
Saturday, October 29, 2005
Investing: Pitfalls to avoid
1) Be wary of companies with large amounts of debt. This rule can be broken for special circumstances, but insure that they are special. The amount of leverage used to carry a gas pipeline would not be appropriate for an insurance company. As a general rule, only bad things can happen with debt. Someday, those pesky, ungrateful lenders will want their money back; and it will always be at an inconvenient time. With too much debt, a small operating problem can be ruinous.
2) Look for high quality earnings. The best companies are those that have very little need for capital, and express all or most of their earnings in cash.
3) If you don't understand how the company makes its profits, don't invest. This would have prevented investing in Enron. Who knows how Enron made (or didn't make) money on its trades.
4) If earnings are too good to be true, they are neither true nor good. The key here is experience. By following many companies, especially in the industry under consideration, the investor should be able to determine when earnings appear excessive. If it can't be determined why the company is more profitable than it should be, question should be asked. A key way of determining this is to compare the profits of the company to its role in the economy. If it is doing something that seems of little value to the economy as a whole, yet showing a huge profit for doing so, become suspicious. If Yellow-number-two-pencils.com is reporting more income than the GDP of a medium size country, something is not right.
5) Avoid companies making a lot of acquisitions in a rush to get big. Serial Acquirers are dangerous to your financial health. Tyco and WorldCom are excellent examples, but there are many more. Good acquisitions are hard to make, and most acquisitions should never happen. They are usually more about the ego of management than about providing returns to shareholders. One of the best ways to evaluate management is to watch it for several years, studying its allocation of capital. If it builds new factories, or buys companies just to get bigger, avoid it; it is a Tyco or WorldCom waiting to happen. Since management usually likes to talk about its acquisitions, and often gives its rational for them, I have found this to be one of the best methods to evaluate its quality.
6) Avoid companies where the managers are paid huge amounts of money even when the company is not doing well. They are not being run for the benefits of anyone but senior management, and it gets paid before you do.
7) Buy companies that have a sustainable competitive advantage, or a moat. Moats come in all kinds of sizes and shapes, so you must learn how to identify them. Study the acquisitions of Warren Buffett; he is a master at identifying moats.
8) Look for companies that do not need to reinvent themselves every two years just to stay alive. Microsoft is one of the few companies that has been successful doing this. But Bill Gates himself said that Microsoft faces a major challenge every three years or so. If you must reinvent yourself, you do not have a moat, or a least a moat that does not require huge amounts of maintenance.
9) Look at what a company does, not what it says. Words are cheap, actions are dear.
10) As a general rule, avoid companies that seem obsessed with providing and meeting earnings expectations. They are playing Wall Street, not Main Street.
11) Look for humility in managers. Is the company run for the benefit of management's' ego and desire for power, privilege and prestige, or is it run as a business enterprise? Look at what seems to motive the people at the top.
12) Look for "one-time," "nonoperating," "extraordinary" charges. Some companies have "one-time" charges every quarter. "Nonoperating" charges become standard operating procedures. And with some companies, "extraordinary" charges occur so often they become ordinary. This is a scam. Often these charges are neither one-time, nonoperating or extraordinary. Excessive amounts of charges show a management that is either making a lot of bad mistakes, or is trying to manage its financial numbers.
13) Beware of the "noncash" trap. Almost all "one-time," "nonoperating" or "extraordinary" charges are noncash. When is the last time you saw cash go bad? So, a "noncash" charge may not require any decrease in the current cash balance, but it does mean that an asset has gone wrong. Do not fall for the "it is only a noncash charge so of no consequence" trap. Can an asset materialize on the balance sheet, at no cost to the company? Assets arise out of the expenditure of cash, the forbearance of another asset, the incurrence of a liability, or the issuance of equity. So, the asset that was wasted in a "noncash" charge once either represented cash, a claim on cash, a promise to pay cash, or the transfer of part of the ownership of the company. So which of those is of so little importance that you will easily dismiss it? All charges are important. All charges mean something. A company can "noncash" charge itself into sweet oblivion. Don't fall for the "its only noncash" excuse.
14) Be cautious of companies where the CEO holds a controlling stake. And be especially cautious when voting control significantly exceeds economic ownership. If the company is all about "me," make sure the "me" is worth being about. Buffett is, but few others are.
15) Never underestimate the ability of bad managers to damage an otherwise strong and healthy company.
16) We all know about a margin of safety in the purchase price of the stock, but is there a margin of safety in the operation of the business? Look at the attitude of the management towards business risk. The more risk in the business, the more those inevitable management mistakes are going to hurt. Look for companies for which the fewest number of things can go wrong. The more the number of things that can go wrong, the more likelihood that something will.
17) Is the company in denial? As you read its annual report, do you have the feeling that management will be the last group to discover that it is a troubled enterprise? There could be whole host of sins in management's behavior: selective hearing, wishful thinking, fear, unrealistic expectations or emotional over-investment. Ask this question: Is this a board room, or a mental ward?
18) Avoid whiplash. If Strategy B, last year's road to glory and replacement for Strategy A, is now being replaced with Strategy C, don't wait for the new fix to end all fixes: Strategy D.
19) Is management ever at fault? Does management always blame others for the problems of the company, or does management take responsibility for its own actions and results? Don't tolerate behavior in the managers of the company that you would not accept from your teenage son.
20) Beware of noncash income. Does the company recognize large parts of its income before it receives the cash? If so, intangible assets will be growing on the balance sheet. Those often ignored and forgotten accounting footnotes are a good source for the discovery of noncash income.
21) Beware of deferred charges. These are created when expenses are not recognized even though the cash has been expended. As with noncash income, look at the footnotes and the balance sheet for explanations and accounting.
22) The problem with large amounts of deferred charges and intangible assets generated from the recognition of income before the receipt of cash, is that they have a tendency to disappear as "one-time," "non-operating" or "extraordinary" charges; and we know how we feel about them. They may also indicate the use of aggressive accounting. But also think about what they do to cash flow and income. Either the cash is spent but not expensed, or the income is recorded but not collected. In both cases, profits benefit even when cash flow does not, resulting in low quality earnings.
23) Compare cash flow and earnings. Do earnings consistently outstrip cash flow by a substantial amount? If so, why? But, don't blindly trust cash flow statements. For instance, changes in current assets and liabilities are a part of operating cash flows. All a company needs to do to increase cash flows is sell some of its trade receivables, or defer payment on trade payables. This activity may boost the cash flow of the current year, but is not sustainable.
24) Study deferred and prepaid income taxes footnotes. These will disclose the differences between income and expenses reported for tax purposes and book purposes. This is one place that evidence of aggressive accounting treatments may be uncovered. Ask yourself: "How much income is being reported for financial purposes, but not being taxed?"
25) Read management's discussion of operations in the annual report. Do they give a plausible explanation of why income, expenses, or sales increased or decreased, or are they vague and general? "Current year's income was up by 11%," doesn't cut it.
26) At least skim through all the footnotes to the financial statements, looking for unusual items. If there are accounts on the balance sheet that are unusual or unclear, the footnotes may provide an explanation. The more confusing the balance sheet is, the more cautious the investor should be.
27) Read the letter to the shareholders on several levels. Look for information, but also look for style and for what was not said. Does it sound like the CEO wrote it himself, or does it read like the work of a PR firm? Does the CEO sound like someone from this planet? I once read the letter to shareholders for a company that was reporting a billion dollar loss for the year, yet not once was it mentioned in the letter. Who, besides himself, was he trying to fool?
28) Three questions: Is management honest? Is management honest? Is management honest? Question managements' take on the results and prospects for the company. If management is not being honest in its communications to investors; run.
29) Be skeptical of industry gurus. For instance, take George Gilder, a telecommunications guru. In February, 2001, Gilder wrote: "Despite the foibles of its management and its revolving CEOs, Global Crossing remains the worlds' best-situated telecom company, achieving its complex and ambitious build-out faster than any previous venture. With its network mostly complete and with cash on hand, it now stands ready to harvest richly from the daring vision of its proponents and investors." Less than a year later, in January, 2002, "the worlds' best-situated telecom company" entered bankruptcy.
30) Be skeptical of managements' claims for its future. Take Sentry Manufacturing Company, a former manufacturer of quartz crystals in Chickasha, Oklahoma. My decision to purchase the stock of this company was brilliant, an opinion shared by the Chairman of the Board of Sentry. Just listen to what he wrote in the third quarter report for 1976. "Due to the quartz crystal watch technology, I believe the quartz crystal industry offers the greatest potential and opportunity of any industry in America today." Bully for me; I had invested in the one industry that "has the greatest potential and opportunity of any industry in America today!" Someday, books will be written about me! Songs will be sung! My joy and confidence were short lived, however. The annual report for 1977 carried the following announcement: "All watch crystal operations were suspended due to Japanese crystal manufacturers buying the domestic market with help from their government and academic community. Sixty percent of the American quartz industry employment was lost during 1977. An American watch crystal industry doesn't exist today." So the industry that had the greatest potential and opportunity of any industry in America in the last few months of 1976, completely disappeared in 1977. Sometimes management has the cloudiest crystal ball of all – with me following close behind.
31) Insider buying and selling is just that: insider buying a selling. The managers of a company are sometimes the least objective interpreters of the company's condition. And managers are not necessarily investors. Just because an individual can find a place in senior management does not mean that he can value a security.
32) Sometimes it is "the balance sheet stupid." Take Conseco. In 1997, Conseco was on top of the world. It earned $550 million. Its stock was soaring. But, its liabilities exceeded its tangible assets. For some companies, this would not matter. Some companies can operate on very little equity. But Conseco was not "some" company. It was an insurance company; a company whose existence was based on its "promises to pay." Ruin followed Conseco, and in 2002 it failed completely.
33) Is goodwill, good? Remember, goodwill only exists because the amount paid exceeded the fair value of the assets purchased in previous acquisitions. Goodwill don't cook rice. It can't be used to build factories or pay debt. It is neither good nor bad, it just is. Remember this when someone touts the book value virtues of a company carrying substantial goodwill.
34) If a company runs off into new lines of business in which management is completely ignorant, be wary. They have convinced themselves that their brilliant business skills are transferable. Unfortunately, they usually aren't.
35) Avoid wishful thinking. Don't let the investment rational read like some version of the following: "If A occurs, followed by B, C and D, then there is great possibility of F occurring. If that happens, then G is sure to follow, especially if H happens." If your reasoning for investing can be summarized as, "if we had some eggs, we could have some ham and eggs, if we had some ham," you are engaged in wishful thinking.
36) Don't fool yourself. Fool others if you must; fool others if you dare. But don't fool yourself; that is the biggest sin of all.
37) Pro Forma earnings may be a scam. There are many examples of companies that have consistently reported both good pro forma earnings and "one-time," "non-operating," "extraordinary" charges. Motorola and AT&T are two. Just like the wizard in the Wizard of Oz, management will implore the investor to "ignore those charges behind that curtain." Pro forma earnings will grow and shine; and all the while, the company's assets are slowly being destroyed by one-time charges. Ignore the bottom line at your own peril.
38) It is not the analysts' fault and it is not the media's fault. Do not blame them, regardless of how off base, inaccurate or conflicted they may be. And if it is being honest in its communications, it is not even management's fault. If you substitute the judgment of someone else for your own judgment and it turns up a looser, do not blame them. Blame yourself. It was your decision. Take ownership of it. Learn from it. Get off your pity pot, and move on. Plus, at every available opportunity, remind me that I wrote this.
39) EBITDA is large neon warning sign to the investor. Do not look away! If you ever see a company reporting EBITDARES, Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, Amortization, Rent, Entertainment and Spitzer - go short.
40) Stick to your knitting. Don't try to be all things to all industries. Find and invest in the industries that you can understand. This will most likely be an industry you actually like. Owning, following and studying a company for many years is more productive if you actually like what they do.
41) You can not make money by buying something you do not want to own in order to sell it to some other person who doesn't care to own it anymore than you do.
41b) Heed the Hierarchy of Values: Buffettesque Intrinsic Value (present value of future cash flows discounted at the long term federal rate), Fair Market Value (present value of future cash flows discounted at the rate you want to earn), Margin of Safety Value (Fair Market Value less an appropriate margin of safety) and Market Price, which could be higher or lower than any of the other three amounts. Buffett's suggestion: buy at Margin of Safety Value.
42) Concentrate your holdings. There is no magic number of stocks to own. And at times, a basket of stocks in a specific industry may be the right strategy. Excessive diversification probably will only result in market results. Instead, just buy an index fund. The investor needs few enough stocks that he can sit around and daydream about them.
43) However, some diversification is necessary. There are some things that are not knowable. Has the CEO and guiding light of the company just lied to federal investigators and destined to spend some quality time in close, federal confinement? Despite all indications to the contrary, does the profitability of the company rest on the continuance of a criminal conspiracy? Has the company cooked the books so well that even someone as clever as you can't discover it? If you own enough securities over a sufficient period of time, something like this will happen to one or more of your positions. I know.
44) Look at how the company views its role in change. Instead of being concerned with industry growth, are they asking if the industry will become commoditized and growth will not even be profitable? Instead of being concerned with the weaknesses of their major rivals and how to beat them, are they asking who else may become a competitor, maybe in some new and different way? Instead of concentrating on adding new and wonderful enhancements to their technologies, products and processes, are they asking if some new technological or social change will completely alter the rules of engagement? Are they concentrating on marketing strategies, or are they asking what their customers actually want? Instead of being consumed with fighting existing government rules and regulations, are they asking what kind of new government policies are likely, and how those changes will affect their operations?
45) Do not believe anything. Suspect everything. Be paranoid.
46) This list will be expanded as public disasters and private losses (mine) continue to accumulate.
2) Look for high quality earnings. The best companies are those that have very little need for capital, and express all or most of their earnings in cash.
3) If you don't understand how the company makes its profits, don't invest. This would have prevented investing in Enron. Who knows how Enron made (or didn't make) money on its trades.
4) If earnings are too good to be true, they are neither true nor good. The key here is experience. By following many companies, especially in the industry under consideration, the investor should be able to determine when earnings appear excessive. If it can't be determined why the company is more profitable than it should be, question should be asked. A key way of determining this is to compare the profits of the company to its role in the economy. If it is doing something that seems of little value to the economy as a whole, yet showing a huge profit for doing so, become suspicious. If Yellow-number-two-pencils.com is reporting more income than the GDP of a medium size country, something is not right.
5) Avoid companies making a lot of acquisitions in a rush to get big. Serial Acquirers are dangerous to your financial health. Tyco and WorldCom are excellent examples, but there are many more. Good acquisitions are hard to make, and most acquisitions should never happen. They are usually more about the ego of management than about providing returns to shareholders. One of the best ways to evaluate management is to watch it for several years, studying its allocation of capital. If it builds new factories, or buys companies just to get bigger, avoid it; it is a Tyco or WorldCom waiting to happen. Since management usually likes to talk about its acquisitions, and often gives its rational for them, I have found this to be one of the best methods to evaluate its quality.
6) Avoid companies where the managers are paid huge amounts of money even when the company is not doing well. They are not being run for the benefits of anyone but senior management, and it gets paid before you do.
7) Buy companies that have a sustainable competitive advantage, or a moat. Moats come in all kinds of sizes and shapes, so you must learn how to identify them. Study the acquisitions of Warren Buffett; he is a master at identifying moats.
8) Look for companies that do not need to reinvent themselves every two years just to stay alive. Microsoft is one of the few companies that has been successful doing this. But Bill Gates himself said that Microsoft faces a major challenge every three years or so. If you must reinvent yourself, you do not have a moat, or a least a moat that does not require huge amounts of maintenance.
9) Look at what a company does, not what it says. Words are cheap, actions are dear.
10) As a general rule, avoid companies that seem obsessed with providing and meeting earnings expectations. They are playing Wall Street, not Main Street.
11) Look for humility in managers. Is the company run for the benefit of management's' ego and desire for power, privilege and prestige, or is it run as a business enterprise? Look at what seems to motive the people at the top.
12) Look for "one-time," "nonoperating," "extraordinary" charges. Some companies have "one-time" charges every quarter. "Nonoperating" charges become standard operating procedures. And with some companies, "extraordinary" charges occur so often they become ordinary. This is a scam. Often these charges are neither one-time, nonoperating or extraordinary. Excessive amounts of charges show a management that is either making a lot of bad mistakes, or is trying to manage its financial numbers.
13) Beware of the "noncash" trap. Almost all "one-time," "nonoperating" or "extraordinary" charges are noncash. When is the last time you saw cash go bad? So, a "noncash" charge may not require any decrease in the current cash balance, but it does mean that an asset has gone wrong. Do not fall for the "it is only a noncash charge so of no consequence" trap. Can an asset materialize on the balance sheet, at no cost to the company? Assets arise out of the expenditure of cash, the forbearance of another asset, the incurrence of a liability, or the issuance of equity. So, the asset that was wasted in a "noncash" charge once either represented cash, a claim on cash, a promise to pay cash, or the transfer of part of the ownership of the company. So which of those is of so little importance that you will easily dismiss it? All charges are important. All charges mean something. A company can "noncash" charge itself into sweet oblivion. Don't fall for the "its only noncash" excuse.
14) Be cautious of companies where the CEO holds a controlling stake. And be especially cautious when voting control significantly exceeds economic ownership. If the company is all about "me," make sure the "me" is worth being about. Buffett is, but few others are.
15) Never underestimate the ability of bad managers to damage an otherwise strong and healthy company.
16) We all know about a margin of safety in the purchase price of the stock, but is there a margin of safety in the operation of the business? Look at the attitude of the management towards business risk. The more risk in the business, the more those inevitable management mistakes are going to hurt. Look for companies for which the fewest number of things can go wrong. The more the number of things that can go wrong, the more likelihood that something will.
17) Is the company in denial? As you read its annual report, do you have the feeling that management will be the last group to discover that it is a troubled enterprise? There could be whole host of sins in management's behavior: selective hearing, wishful thinking, fear, unrealistic expectations or emotional over-investment. Ask this question: Is this a board room, or a mental ward?
18) Avoid whiplash. If Strategy B, last year's road to glory and replacement for Strategy A, is now being replaced with Strategy C, don't wait for the new fix to end all fixes: Strategy D.
19) Is management ever at fault? Does management always blame others for the problems of the company, or does management take responsibility for its own actions and results? Don't tolerate behavior in the managers of the company that you would not accept from your teenage son.
20) Beware of noncash income. Does the company recognize large parts of its income before it receives the cash? If so, intangible assets will be growing on the balance sheet. Those often ignored and forgotten accounting footnotes are a good source for the discovery of noncash income.
21) Beware of deferred charges. These are created when expenses are not recognized even though the cash has been expended. As with noncash income, look at the footnotes and the balance sheet for explanations and accounting.
22) The problem with large amounts of deferred charges and intangible assets generated from the recognition of income before the receipt of cash, is that they have a tendency to disappear as "one-time," "non-operating" or "extraordinary" charges; and we know how we feel about them. They may also indicate the use of aggressive accounting. But also think about what they do to cash flow and income. Either the cash is spent but not expensed, or the income is recorded but not collected. In both cases, profits benefit even when cash flow does not, resulting in low quality earnings.
23) Compare cash flow and earnings. Do earnings consistently outstrip cash flow by a substantial amount? If so, why? But, don't blindly trust cash flow statements. For instance, changes in current assets and liabilities are a part of operating cash flows. All a company needs to do to increase cash flows is sell some of its trade receivables, or defer payment on trade payables. This activity may boost the cash flow of the current year, but is not sustainable.
24) Study deferred and prepaid income taxes footnotes. These will disclose the differences between income and expenses reported for tax purposes and book purposes. This is one place that evidence of aggressive accounting treatments may be uncovered. Ask yourself: "How much income is being reported for financial purposes, but not being taxed?"
25) Read management's discussion of operations in the annual report. Do they give a plausible explanation of why income, expenses, or sales increased or decreased, or are they vague and general? "Current year's income was up by 11%," doesn't cut it.
26) At least skim through all the footnotes to the financial statements, looking for unusual items. If there are accounts on the balance sheet that are unusual or unclear, the footnotes may provide an explanation. The more confusing the balance sheet is, the more cautious the investor should be.
27) Read the letter to the shareholders on several levels. Look for information, but also look for style and for what was not said. Does it sound like the CEO wrote it himself, or does it read like the work of a PR firm? Does the CEO sound like someone from this planet? I once read the letter to shareholders for a company that was reporting a billion dollar loss for the year, yet not once was it mentioned in the letter. Who, besides himself, was he trying to fool?
28) Three questions: Is management honest? Is management honest? Is management honest? Question managements' take on the results and prospects for the company. If management is not being honest in its communications to investors; run.
29) Be skeptical of industry gurus. For instance, take George Gilder, a telecommunications guru. In February, 2001, Gilder wrote: "Despite the foibles of its management and its revolving CEOs, Global Crossing remains the worlds' best-situated telecom company, achieving its complex and ambitious build-out faster than any previous venture. With its network mostly complete and with cash on hand, it now stands ready to harvest richly from the daring vision of its proponents and investors." Less than a year later, in January, 2002, "the worlds' best-situated telecom company" entered bankruptcy.
30) Be skeptical of managements' claims for its future. Take Sentry Manufacturing Company, a former manufacturer of quartz crystals in Chickasha, Oklahoma. My decision to purchase the stock of this company was brilliant, an opinion shared by the Chairman of the Board of Sentry. Just listen to what he wrote in the third quarter report for 1976. "Due to the quartz crystal watch technology, I believe the quartz crystal industry offers the greatest potential and opportunity of any industry in America today." Bully for me; I had invested in the one industry that "has the greatest potential and opportunity of any industry in America today!" Someday, books will be written about me! Songs will be sung! My joy and confidence were short lived, however. The annual report for 1977 carried the following announcement: "All watch crystal operations were suspended due to Japanese crystal manufacturers buying the domestic market with help from their government and academic community. Sixty percent of the American quartz industry employment was lost during 1977. An American watch crystal industry doesn't exist today." So the industry that had the greatest potential and opportunity of any industry in America in the last few months of 1976, completely disappeared in 1977. Sometimes management has the cloudiest crystal ball of all – with me following close behind.
31) Insider buying and selling is just that: insider buying a selling. The managers of a company are sometimes the least objective interpreters of the company's condition. And managers are not necessarily investors. Just because an individual can find a place in senior management does not mean that he can value a security.
32) Sometimes it is "the balance sheet stupid." Take Conseco. In 1997, Conseco was on top of the world. It earned $550 million. Its stock was soaring. But, its liabilities exceeded its tangible assets. For some companies, this would not matter. Some companies can operate on very little equity. But Conseco was not "some" company. It was an insurance company; a company whose existence was based on its "promises to pay." Ruin followed Conseco, and in 2002 it failed completely.
33) Is goodwill, good? Remember, goodwill only exists because the amount paid exceeded the fair value of the assets purchased in previous acquisitions. Goodwill don't cook rice. It can't be used to build factories or pay debt. It is neither good nor bad, it just is. Remember this when someone touts the book value virtues of a company carrying substantial goodwill.
34) If a company runs off into new lines of business in which management is completely ignorant, be wary. They have convinced themselves that their brilliant business skills are transferable. Unfortunately, they usually aren't.
35) Avoid wishful thinking. Don't let the investment rational read like some version of the following: "If A occurs, followed by B, C and D, then there is great possibility of F occurring. If that happens, then G is sure to follow, especially if H happens." If your reasoning for investing can be summarized as, "if we had some eggs, we could have some ham and eggs, if we had some ham," you are engaged in wishful thinking.
36) Don't fool yourself. Fool others if you must; fool others if you dare. But don't fool yourself; that is the biggest sin of all.
37) Pro Forma earnings may be a scam. There are many examples of companies that have consistently reported both good pro forma earnings and "one-time," "non-operating," "extraordinary" charges. Motorola and AT&T are two. Just like the wizard in the Wizard of Oz, management will implore the investor to "ignore those charges behind that curtain." Pro forma earnings will grow and shine; and all the while, the company's assets are slowly being destroyed by one-time charges. Ignore the bottom line at your own peril.
38) It is not the analysts' fault and it is not the media's fault. Do not blame them, regardless of how off base, inaccurate or conflicted they may be. And if it is being honest in its communications, it is not even management's fault. If you substitute the judgment of someone else for your own judgment and it turns up a looser, do not blame them. Blame yourself. It was your decision. Take ownership of it. Learn from it. Get off your pity pot, and move on. Plus, at every available opportunity, remind me that I wrote this.
39) EBITDA is large neon warning sign to the investor. Do not look away! If you ever see a company reporting EBITDARES, Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, Amortization, Rent, Entertainment and Spitzer - go short.
40) Stick to your knitting. Don't try to be all things to all industries. Find and invest in the industries that you can understand. This will most likely be an industry you actually like. Owning, following and studying a company for many years is more productive if you actually like what they do.
41) You can not make money by buying something you do not want to own in order to sell it to some other person who doesn't care to own it anymore than you do.
41b) Heed the Hierarchy of Values: Buffettesque Intrinsic Value (present value of future cash flows discounted at the long term federal rate), Fair Market Value (present value of future cash flows discounted at the rate you want to earn), Margin of Safety Value (Fair Market Value less an appropriate margin of safety) and Market Price, which could be higher or lower than any of the other three amounts. Buffett's suggestion: buy at Margin of Safety Value.
42) Concentrate your holdings. There is no magic number of stocks to own. And at times, a basket of stocks in a specific industry may be the right strategy. Excessive diversification probably will only result in market results. Instead, just buy an index fund. The investor needs few enough stocks that he can sit around and daydream about them.
43) However, some diversification is necessary. There are some things that are not knowable. Has the CEO and guiding light of the company just lied to federal investigators and destined to spend some quality time in close, federal confinement? Despite all indications to the contrary, does the profitability of the company rest on the continuance of a criminal conspiracy? Has the company cooked the books so well that even someone as clever as you can't discover it? If you own enough securities over a sufficient period of time, something like this will happen to one or more of your positions. I know.
44) Look at how the company views its role in change. Instead of being concerned with industry growth, are they asking if the industry will become commoditized and growth will not even be profitable? Instead of being concerned with the weaknesses of their major rivals and how to beat them, are they asking who else may become a competitor, maybe in some new and different way? Instead of concentrating on adding new and wonderful enhancements to their technologies, products and processes, are they asking if some new technological or social change will completely alter the rules of engagement? Are they concentrating on marketing strategies, or are they asking what their customers actually want? Instead of being consumed with fighting existing government rules and regulations, are they asking what kind of new government policies are likely, and how those changes will affect their operations?
45) Do not believe anything. Suspect everything. Be paranoid.
46) This list will be expanded as public disasters and private losses (mine) continue to accumulate.
Is October sinful??
Shareholder letter 1987 –Mr. Market
Guess what has Buffet to stay in the year of the great crash about the markets when he lost 342 mn US$ personally in the October crash.
Our market also cracking in October. Is October sinful.????
Buffet strangely quotes the market to be his friend who is very emotional. At times he is very euphoric and can see only the positive things. At times he is a manic- depressive mood he will let you anything at any price for he sees everything bad.
I remember Buffet earlier saying: be fearful when others are greedy and greedy when others are fearful.
Something I can associate very well with the markets in India now…which last month rose by 1000 points and this month have fallen by more than 1000 points. While most results have been better than analyst expectations (All analysts were also euphoric). This is because most people tend to invest in stocks and not underlying business. (Easy to say than do. invests in business) This thinking helps if one is into the business of arbitrage but definitely not while investing. And I think the Indian market will also behave like a manic and give ample opportunities to buy. The worst part of investing in the stock markets is that it is addictive. Especially with many real time online portfolio management software’s one tends to see his portfolio position on an hourly basis. Something one does when he is in a Casino.
And my recent experience in the market makes me believe that markets will be anything but fairly valued. I am suddenly reminded of the Efficient market hypothesis. Until and unless the irrationality of human beings can be factored into economic and financial models it would be difficult to get anything but impractical theories out of them. (Heard about: Theory for theory sake)
Buffet says that Mr. . Market is often in a foolish mood and it is for you to either ignore him or to take advantage of him, but it will be disastrous if you fall under his influence. Indeed, if you aren't certain that you understand and can value your business far better than Mr. Market, you don't belong in the game. It is always you that have been right or wrong and not the market.
Therefore to evaluate ones investments one should look at the operating results rather than their daily, or even yearly, price quotations. The market may ignore business success for a while, but eventually will confirm it. As Ben Graham said: "In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run it is a weighing machine."
Sometimes, of course, the market may judge a business to be more valuable than the underlying facts would indicate it is. In such a case, we will sell our holdings. Sometimes, also, we will sell a security that is fairly valued or even undervalued because we require funds for a still more undervalued investment or one we believe we understand better.
Buffet also speaks about the need to check the trade deficit:
Of course, the U.S. may take steps to stem our trade deficit well before our position as a net debtor gets out of hand. (In that respect, the falling dollar will help, though unfortunately it will hurt in other ways.) Nevertheless, our government's behavior in this test of its mettle is apt to be consistent with its Scarlett O'Hara approach generally: "I'll think about it tomorrow." And, almost inevitably, procrastination in facing up to fiscal problems will have inflationary consequences. Both the timing and the sweep of those consequences are unpredictable. But our inability to quantify or time the risk does not mean we should ignore it. While recognizing the possibility that we may be wrong and that present interest rates may adequately compensate for the inflationary risk, we retain a general fear of long-term bonds.
Quotes :
David Oglivy's advice: "Develop your eccentricities while you are young. That way, when you get old, people won't think you're going ga-ga."
Comment for those who looking for the one big bet (story):
That is, they usually confer the highest price-earnings ratios on exotic-sounding businesses that hold out the promise of feverish change. That prospect lets investors fantasize about future profitability rather than face today's business realities. For such investor-dreamers, any blind date is preferable to one with the girl next door, no matter how desirable she may be.
On change:
Business that constantly encounters major change also encounters many chances for major error.
Banter:
Agatha Christie, whose husband was an archaeologist, said that was the perfect profession for one's spouse: "The older you become, the more interested they are in you."
Questioning the dollar exchange value as early as 1987:
Bonds are no better than the currency in which they are denominated, and nothing we have seen in the past year - or past decade - makes us enthusiastic about the long-term future of U.S. currency.
On keeping cash on hand for capital allocation:
Our basic principle is that if you want to shoot rare, fast-moving elephants, you should always carry a loaded gun.
Guess what has Buffet to stay in the year of the great crash about the markets when he lost 342 mn US$ personally in the October crash.
Our market also cracking in October. Is October sinful.????
Buffet strangely quotes the market to be his friend who is very emotional. At times he is very euphoric and can see only the positive things. At times he is a manic- depressive mood he will let you anything at any price for he sees everything bad.
I remember Buffet earlier saying: be fearful when others are greedy and greedy when others are fearful.
Something I can associate very well with the markets in India now…which last month rose by 1000 points and this month have fallen by more than 1000 points. While most results have been better than analyst expectations (All analysts were also euphoric). This is because most people tend to invest in stocks and not underlying business. (Easy to say than do. invests in business) This thinking helps if one is into the business of arbitrage but definitely not while investing. And I think the Indian market will also behave like a manic and give ample opportunities to buy. The worst part of investing in the stock markets is that it is addictive. Especially with many real time online portfolio management software’s one tends to see his portfolio position on an hourly basis. Something one does when he is in a Casino.
And my recent experience in the market makes me believe that markets will be anything but fairly valued. I am suddenly reminded of the Efficient market hypothesis. Until and unless the irrationality of human beings can be factored into economic and financial models it would be difficult to get anything but impractical theories out of them. (Heard about: Theory for theory sake)
Buffet says that Mr. . Market is often in a foolish mood and it is for you to either ignore him or to take advantage of him, but it will be disastrous if you fall under his influence. Indeed, if you aren't certain that you understand and can value your business far better than Mr. Market, you don't belong in the game. It is always you that have been right or wrong and not the market.
Therefore to evaluate ones investments one should look at the operating results rather than their daily, or even yearly, price quotations. The market may ignore business success for a while, but eventually will confirm it. As Ben Graham said: "In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run it is a weighing machine."
Sometimes, of course, the market may judge a business to be more valuable than the underlying facts would indicate it is. In such a case, we will sell our holdings. Sometimes, also, we will sell a security that is fairly valued or even undervalued because we require funds for a still more undervalued investment or one we believe we understand better.
Buffet also speaks about the need to check the trade deficit:
Of course, the U.S. may take steps to stem our trade deficit well before our position as a net debtor gets out of hand. (In that respect, the falling dollar will help, though unfortunately it will hurt in other ways.) Nevertheless, our government's behavior in this test of its mettle is apt to be consistent with its Scarlett O'Hara approach generally: "I'll think about it tomorrow." And, almost inevitably, procrastination in facing up to fiscal problems will have inflationary consequences. Both the timing and the sweep of those consequences are unpredictable. But our inability to quantify or time the risk does not mean we should ignore it. While recognizing the possibility that we may be wrong and that present interest rates may adequately compensate for the inflationary risk, we retain a general fear of long-term bonds.
Quotes :
David Oglivy's advice: "Develop your eccentricities while you are young. That way, when you get old, people won't think you're going ga-ga."
Comment for those who looking for the one big bet (story):
That is, they usually confer the highest price-earnings ratios on exotic-sounding businesses that hold out the promise of feverish change. That prospect lets investors fantasize about future profitability rather than face today's business realities. For such investor-dreamers, any blind date is preferable to one with the girl next door, no matter how desirable she may be.
On change:
Business that constantly encounters major change also encounters many chances for major error.
Banter:
Agatha Christie, whose husband was an archaeologist, said that was the perfect profession for one's spouse: "The older you become, the more interested they are in you."
Questioning the dollar exchange value as early as 1987:
Bonds are no better than the currency in which they are denominated, and nothing we have seen in the past year - or past decade - makes us enthusiastic about the long-term future of U.S. currency.
On keeping cash on hand for capital allocation:
Our basic principle is that if you want to shoot rare, fast-moving elephants, you should always carry a loaded gun.
Friday, October 28, 2005
Shareholder letter 1987 - Accountants
Shareholder letter 1987- Accountants
(Immediate crash and aftermath of October, Berkshire loses 25% of its value, dropping from $4,230 per share to around $3,170.)
This years letter Buffet comments heavily on two things: accountants and Mr. Market.( I will write about this later)
While every bubble in the stock market or corporate profits is unexceptionally followed by the revelation of a few cooked up numbers and some big scandals. Invariably, be it any kind of corporate misadventure an accountant definitely has a signature on it certifying the veracity of the umbers and assumptions and blah blah…..
Buffet comments on the very fact that accountant audit statements have so many riders, that it is hard to believe or trust annual reports. Accountants only certify the corrupt practices of fly by night corporate managers, with enough safeguards to protect their ass. Anderson was the biggest mistake – it could not save itself.
Buffet was commenting on the lack of sufficient provisioning in the insurance sector:
Auditors annually certify the numbers given them by management and in their opinions unqualifiedly state that these figures "present fairly" the financial position of their Clients. The auditors use this reassuring language even though they know from long and painful experience that the numbers so certified are likely to differ dramatically from the true earnings of the period. Despite this history of error, investors understandably rely upon auditors' opinions. After all, a declaration saying that "the statements present fairly" hardly sounds equivocal to the non-accountant.
This is how an accountant’s disclaimer should read:
"We have relied upon representations of management in respect to the liabilities shown for losses and loss adjustment expenses, the estimate of which, in turn, very materially affects the earnings and financial condition herein reported. We can express no opinion about the accuracy of these figures. Subject to that important reservation, in our opinion, etc."
If lawsuits develop in respect to wildly inaccurate financial statements (which they do), auditors will definitely say something of that sort in court anyway. Why should they not be forthright about their role and its limitations from the outset?
While the question is not about questioning accountants abilities to accurately judge. The fact of the matter is that they can’t do the job and that’s it.
No wonder such emphasis is being laid upon corporate governance and stuff. And also the fact of the matter that they very much earn from the people whose numbers they are supposed to judge…makes it hard to believe that its clients will ever honor a Good accountant.
Guess what he had to say about MBA’s
Moreover, our experience with newly-minted MBAs has not been that great. Their academic records always look terrific and the candidates always know just what to say; but too often they are short on personal commitment to the company and general business savvy. It’s difficult to teach a new dog old tricks.
(Immediate crash and aftermath of October, Berkshire loses 25% of its value, dropping from $4,230 per share to around $3,170.)
This years letter Buffet comments heavily on two things: accountants and Mr. Market.( I will write about this later)
While every bubble in the stock market or corporate profits is unexceptionally followed by the revelation of a few cooked up numbers and some big scandals. Invariably, be it any kind of corporate misadventure an accountant definitely has a signature on it certifying the veracity of the umbers and assumptions and blah blah…..
Buffet comments on the very fact that accountant audit statements have so many riders, that it is hard to believe or trust annual reports. Accountants only certify the corrupt practices of fly by night corporate managers, with enough safeguards to protect their ass. Anderson was the biggest mistake – it could not save itself.
Buffet was commenting on the lack of sufficient provisioning in the insurance sector:
Auditors annually certify the numbers given them by management and in their opinions unqualifiedly state that these figures "present fairly" the financial position of their Clients. The auditors use this reassuring language even though they know from long and painful experience that the numbers so certified are likely to differ dramatically from the true earnings of the period. Despite this history of error, investors understandably rely upon auditors' opinions. After all, a declaration saying that "the statements present fairly" hardly sounds equivocal to the non-accountant.
This is how an accountant’s disclaimer should read:
"We have relied upon representations of management in respect to the liabilities shown for losses and loss adjustment expenses, the estimate of which, in turn, very materially affects the earnings and financial condition herein reported. We can express no opinion about the accuracy of these figures. Subject to that important reservation, in our opinion, etc."
If lawsuits develop in respect to wildly inaccurate financial statements (which they do), auditors will definitely say something of that sort in court anyway. Why should they not be forthright about their role and its limitations from the outset?
While the question is not about questioning accountants abilities to accurately judge. The fact of the matter is that they can’t do the job and that’s it.
No wonder such emphasis is being laid upon corporate governance and stuff. And also the fact of the matter that they very much earn from the people whose numbers they are supposed to judge…makes it hard to believe that its clients will ever honor a Good accountant.
Guess what he had to say about MBA’s
Moreover, our experience with newly-minted MBAs has not been that great. Their academic records always look terrific and the candidates always know just what to say; but too often they are short on personal commitment to the company and general business savvy. It’s difficult to teach a new dog old tricks.
Tuesday, October 25, 2005
Buffets shareholder letter 1986- People
Warren buffets shareholder letter –1986 (People)
Berkshire continues its amazing performance adding 26.1% to its net worth. In this shareholder letter buffet begins with praising the management team (the Ceo’s) he has with him and quotes David Ogilvy: "If each of us hires people who are smaller than we are, we shall become a company of dwarfs. But, if each of us hires people who are bigger than we are, we shall become a company of giants."
Buffets write about the economics of the world book business he had bought last year, which was the best in the direct sales encyclopedia business. Also he bought Fechheimer, a uniform manufacturing and distribution business company, which was a result of the advertisement he had done. While Buffet mentions the remarkable business he also mentions something, which I do not agree with:
Buffet had never visited the firm or looked at its infrastructure and does not advice the same. Something I believe one should doing, at least now. A first hand look at the infra. plant, operations I believe is a must.
A cue on the markets:
When conditions are right that is, when companies with good economics and good management sell well below intrinsic business value - stocks sometimes provide grand-slam home runs. But we currently find no equities that come close to meeting our tests. This statement in no way translates into a stock market prediction: we have no idea - and never have had - whether the market is going to go up, down, or sideways in the near- or intermediate term future.
( Is it warren buffet talking about overvalued markets?You all know.)
Comments on the trading:
Indeed, the term "institutional investor" is becoming one of those self-contradictions called an oxymoron, comparable to "jumbo shrimp," "lady mud wrestler" and "inexpensive lawyer."
Comment on he buying a corporate jet, saying that he was trying to attribute positive arguments for what we wanted to do:
"So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a reason for everything one has a mind to do."
Berkshire continues its amazing performance adding 26.1% to its net worth. In this shareholder letter buffet begins with praising the management team (the Ceo’s) he has with him and quotes David Ogilvy: "If each of us hires people who are smaller than we are, we shall become a company of dwarfs. But, if each of us hires people who are bigger than we are, we shall become a company of giants."
Buffets write about the economics of the world book business he had bought last year, which was the best in the direct sales encyclopedia business. Also he bought Fechheimer, a uniform manufacturing and distribution business company, which was a result of the advertisement he had done. While Buffet mentions the remarkable business he also mentions something, which I do not agree with:
Buffet had never visited the firm or looked at its infrastructure and does not advice the same. Something I believe one should doing, at least now. A first hand look at the infra. plant, operations I believe is a must.
A cue on the markets:
When conditions are right that is, when companies with good economics and good management sell well below intrinsic business value - stocks sometimes provide grand-slam home runs. But we currently find no equities that come close to meeting our tests. This statement in no way translates into a stock market prediction: we have no idea - and never have had - whether the market is going to go up, down, or sideways in the near- or intermediate term future.
( Is it warren buffet talking about overvalued markets?You all know.)
Comments on the trading:
Indeed, the term "institutional investor" is becoming one of those self-contradictions called an oxymoron, comparable to "jumbo shrimp," "lady mud wrestler" and "inexpensive lawyer."
Comment on he buying a corporate jet, saying that he was trying to attribute positive arguments for what we wanted to do:
"So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables one to find or make a reason for everything one has a mind to do."
Friday, October 21, 2005
Buffets shareholder letter 1985 - Esops
Warren Buffets shareholder letter 1985.
Buffet speaks in this letter in great length the economics of Employee stock options.
Share prices rise relatively higher when companies do not give Dividend as the net worth of the company increases. However, the return, which shareholders might get, is relatively low as managements with ESOPs are more concerned about the stock price then shareholder value. While a shareholder may get less returns when no dividend is rolled out, as the money retained may not give enough returns (if money is retained). Therefore, ESOPs may induce behavior (which has been witnessed) to increase share price and not shareholder value.
Reinsurance business – Buffet comments on the dynamics.
In this case the seller knows most about the risk and is selling a part (most of it) of risk to you at a Price. Such deals had earlier seen long losses for the insurance industry where Reinsures where not able to appraise the risk/ return profile and have gradually moved away from it. Risks in this case are very long drawn and this made some of the competition very skeptical of such deals. This is when Berkshire Hathaway (Insurance business) actually ran an Ad in a newspaper that they are willing to reinsure and looking for big contracts. (Buffet also runs an ad in his shareholder letter, inviting friendly business acquisitions).
Argument: The behavior of reinsurers finally becomes like that of Mark Twain’s cat: having once sat on a hot stove, it never did so again - but it never again sat on a cold stove, either. I think anything can be bought, provided it is at the right price.
It is interesting to note that most of Buffets investments in earlier days were commodity business against his regularly applauding the Brand value (Coke, Gillette).
His earlier investments – Textile (shut), Insurance, Furniture (Nebraska- Cheapest seller) etc. Candy and newspaper business could be off some brand value…
Learning:
What could be the most rational things for individuals to do, when the same decision looked collectively may appear poor. Just as happens when each person watching a parade decides he can see a little better if he stands on tiptoes.
This is what buffet was talking about Insurance companies decision to raise capital (increase capacity). “Viewed individually, each company’s capital investment decision appeared cost-effective and rational; viewed collectively, the decisions neutralized each other and were irrational. “
I think this is happening with the Textile industry ( Textile quota, global demand expectations- Increase capacity) and the Banking sector in India(Credit growth expectations – Raise Capital).
Some good quotes from the 1985 Letter:
Chairman, Charlie Munger, has always emphasized the study of mistakes rather than successes, both in business and other aspects of life. He does so in the spirit of the man who said: “All I want to know is where I’m going to die so I’ll never go there.”
Shutting down the textile business:
Comte’s advice - “the intellect should be the servant of the heart, but not its slave”
Samuel Johnson’s horse: “A horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse - not a remarkable mathematician.” Likewise, a textile company that allocates capital brilliantly within its industry is a remarkable textile company - but not a remarkable business.
“When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.”
An oil prospector, moving to his heavenly reward, was met by St. Peter with bad news. “You’re qualified for residence”, said St. Peter, “but, as you can see, the compound reserved for oil men is packed. There’s no way to squeeze you in.” After thinking a moment, the prospector asked if he might say just four words to the present occupants. That seemed harmless to St. Peter, so the prospector cupped his hands and yelled, “Oil discovered in hell.” Immediately the gate to the compound opened and all of the oil men marched out to head for the nether regions. Impressed, St. Peter invited the prospector to move in and make himself comfortable. The prospector paused. “No,” he said, “I think I’ll go along with the rest of the boys. There might be some truth to that rumor after all.”
Buffet speaks in this letter in great length the economics of Employee stock options.
Share prices rise relatively higher when companies do not give Dividend as the net worth of the company increases. However, the return, which shareholders might get, is relatively low as managements with ESOPs are more concerned about the stock price then shareholder value. While a shareholder may get less returns when no dividend is rolled out, as the money retained may not give enough returns (if money is retained). Therefore, ESOPs may induce behavior (which has been witnessed) to increase share price and not shareholder value.
Reinsurance business – Buffet comments on the dynamics.
In this case the seller knows most about the risk and is selling a part (most of it) of risk to you at a Price. Such deals had earlier seen long losses for the insurance industry where Reinsures where not able to appraise the risk/ return profile and have gradually moved away from it. Risks in this case are very long drawn and this made some of the competition very skeptical of such deals. This is when Berkshire Hathaway (Insurance business) actually ran an Ad in a newspaper that they are willing to reinsure and looking for big contracts. (Buffet also runs an ad in his shareholder letter, inviting friendly business acquisitions).
Argument: The behavior of reinsurers finally becomes like that of Mark Twain’s cat: having once sat on a hot stove, it never did so again - but it never again sat on a cold stove, either. I think anything can be bought, provided it is at the right price.
It is interesting to note that most of Buffets investments in earlier days were commodity business against his regularly applauding the Brand value (Coke, Gillette).
His earlier investments – Textile (shut), Insurance, Furniture (Nebraska- Cheapest seller) etc. Candy and newspaper business could be off some brand value…
Learning:
What could be the most rational things for individuals to do, when the same decision looked collectively may appear poor. Just as happens when each person watching a parade decides he can see a little better if he stands on tiptoes.
This is what buffet was talking about Insurance companies decision to raise capital (increase capacity). “Viewed individually, each company’s capital investment decision appeared cost-effective and rational; viewed collectively, the decisions neutralized each other and were irrational. “
I think this is happening with the Textile industry ( Textile quota, global demand expectations- Increase capacity) and the Banking sector in India(Credit growth expectations – Raise Capital).
Some good quotes from the 1985 Letter:
Chairman, Charlie Munger, has always emphasized the study of mistakes rather than successes, both in business and other aspects of life. He does so in the spirit of the man who said: “All I want to know is where I’m going to die so I’ll never go there.”
Shutting down the textile business:
Comte’s advice - “the intellect should be the servant of the heart, but not its slave”
Samuel Johnson’s horse: “A horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse - not a remarkable mathematician.” Likewise, a textile company that allocates capital brilliantly within its industry is a remarkable textile company - but not a remarkable business.
“When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.”
An oil prospector, moving to his heavenly reward, was met by St. Peter with bad news. “You’re qualified for residence”, said St. Peter, “but, as you can see, the compound reserved for oil men is packed. There’s no way to squeeze you in.” After thinking a moment, the prospector asked if he might say just four words to the present occupants. That seemed harmless to St. Peter, so the prospector cupped his hands and yelled, “Oil discovered in hell.” Immediately the gate to the compound opened and all of the oil men marched out to head for the nether regions. Impressed, St. Peter invited the prospector to move in and make himself comfortable. The prospector paused. “No,” he said, “I think I’ll go along with the rest of the boys. There might be some truth to that rumor after all.”
Thursday, October 20, 2005
Phantom Markets - Karachi
Last few days have been quite interesting:
I have started to read all of Warren buffets shareholders letters from the starting. I have finished 1977-1984 till now. They are quite interesting and well worth a read. What I propose to do is make notes of all as each one of them has a lot of theory and guidance about investment behavior.
In the last 7 years Buffet mentions 3 times in his letters:
Pascal: “It has struck me that all the misfortunes of men spring from the single cause that they are unable to stay quietly in one room.”
(Read the article on Buffets ability to do nothing in my earlier blog - An article by Mohnish Pabrai)
I think the same goes for investors trading behavior. I know many of you rode the upside well andmade money. While now everything looks cheaper then yesterday. I am not really sure how the valuations look, the last time I was bearish was at the same Sensex levels 7750.
Yesterday, one of my friends with whom I was discussing Sensex levels and stuff showed me the chart of Karachi stock index (KSE-100 index). It had risen by from around 2400 levels to 9000 levels (peak of 10000) in the last 2 1/2 years. Amazingly we just moved from 5000 to 8000 levels. Another interesting fact is that Market cap of Karachi stock exchange in only close to US$ 50bn. To put into perspective Bharti Tele Market Cap is about US$ 11bn. While it is difficult for us to forget may 17th 2005, the Karachi stock index fell from 10305 on 15th March 2005 to 8314. (Yeah, 20% circuit). Well very clearly a phantom market existed in Pakistan (In retrospective everything looks so clear and logical).
A brief on Karachi stock Exchange:
The Karachi stock exchange has since long been controlled by a number of rich families with almost negligible regulatory intervention. The Kse –100 index accounts for 85% of the market Cap and the state owned telecom and energy companies account for 45% of the index.
While nothing like a phantom market exists in India, but it definitely makes sense to sit still and do nothing. While taking calls on index and stocks is very easy it is extremely impossible to predict the timing. (I learnt this the hard way) So, in case your fundamental picks have fallen it is the right time to add a few more quantity gradually to your portfolio.
I have started to read all of Warren buffets shareholders letters from the starting. I have finished 1977-1984 till now. They are quite interesting and well worth a read. What I propose to do is make notes of all as each one of them has a lot of theory and guidance about investment behavior.
In the last 7 years Buffet mentions 3 times in his letters:
Pascal: “It has struck me that all the misfortunes of men spring from the single cause that they are unable to stay quietly in one room.”
(Read the article on Buffets ability to do nothing in my earlier blog - An article by Mohnish Pabrai)
I think the same goes for investors trading behavior. I know many of you rode the upside well andmade money. While now everything looks cheaper then yesterday. I am not really sure how the valuations look, the last time I was bearish was at the same Sensex levels 7750.
Yesterday, one of my friends with whom I was discussing Sensex levels and stuff showed me the chart of Karachi stock index (KSE-100 index). It had risen by from around 2400 levels to 9000 levels (peak of 10000) in the last 2 1/2 years. Amazingly we just moved from 5000 to 8000 levels. Another interesting fact is that Market cap of Karachi stock exchange in only close to US$ 50bn. To put into perspective Bharti Tele Market Cap is about US$ 11bn. While it is difficult for us to forget may 17th 2005, the Karachi stock index fell from 10305 on 15th March 2005 to 8314. (Yeah, 20% circuit). Well very clearly a phantom market existed in Pakistan (In retrospective everything looks so clear and logical).
A brief on Karachi stock Exchange:
The Karachi stock exchange has since long been controlled by a number of rich families with almost negligible regulatory intervention. The Kse –100 index accounts for 85% of the market Cap and the state owned telecom and energy companies account for 45% of the index.
While nothing like a phantom market exists in India, but it definitely makes sense to sit still and do nothing. While taking calls on index and stocks is very easy it is extremely impossible to predict the timing. (I learnt this the hard way) So, in case your fundamental picks have fallen it is the right time to add a few more quantity gradually to your portfolio.
Tuesday, October 18, 2005
Buffet Succeeds at nothing
Warren Buffett is known as being one of the best investors of all time. But it might come as a surprise to many that his investing strategy often encompasses long periods of what he calls "sitting on my butt." There have been periods of years when Berkshire Hathaway has purchased not a single share of stock, interspersed with some enormous activity. Sometimes doing nothing is the best thing you can do.
By Mohnish Pabrai October 30, 2002
Seventeenth century French scientist Blaise Pascal is perhaps best remembered for his contributions to the field of pure geometry. In the 39 years that he lived, he found time to invent such modern day fundamentals as the syringe, the hydraulic press, and the first digital calculator. And, if that weren't enough, he was also a profound philosopher. One of my favorite Pascal quotes is: "All man's miseries derive from not being able to sit quietly in a room alone."
I've often thought that Pascal's words, slightly adapted, might apply well to a relatively new subset of humanity: "All portfolio managers' miseries derive from not being able to sit quietly in a room alone."
Why should portfolio managers sit and do nothing? And why would that be good for them? Well, let's start with the story of D.E. Shaw & Co. Founded in 1988, Shaw was staffed by some of the brightest mathematicians, computer scientists, and bond trading experts on the planet. Jeff Bezos worked at Shaw before embarking on his Amazon.com (Nasdaq: AMZN) journey. These folks found that there was a lot of money to be made with risk-free arbitrage in the bond markets with some highly sophisticated bond arbitrage trading algorithms.
Shaw was able to capitalize on minuscule short-term inefficiencies in the bond markets with highly leveraged capital. The annualized returns were nothing short of spectacular -- and all of it risk-free! The bright folks at Shaw put their trading on autopilot, with minimal human tweaking required. They came to work and mostly played pool or video games or just goofed off. Shaw's profit per employee was astronomical, and everyone was happy with this Utopian arrangement.
Eventually, the nerds got fidgety -- they wanted to do something. They felt that they had only scratched the surface and, if they only dug deeper, there would be more gold to be mined. And so they fiddled with the system to try to juice returns.
What followed was a similar path taken by Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a fund once considered so big and so smart on Wall Street that it simply could not fail. And yet, when economic events that did not conform to its historical model took place in rapid succession, it nearly did just that. There was a gradual movement from pure risk-free arbitrage to playing the risky arbitrage game in the equity markets. A lot more capital could be deployed, and the returns looked appealing. With no guaranteed short-term convergence and highly leveraged positions, the eventual result was a blow-up that nearly wiped out the firm.
Compared to nearly any other discipline, I find that fund management is, in many respects, a bizarre field --where hard work and intellect don't necessarily lead to satisfactory results. As Warren Buffett succinctly put it during the 1998 Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A) annual meeting: "We don't get paid for activity, just for being right. As to how long we'll wait, we'll wait indefinitely!"
Buffett and his business partner Charlie Munger are easily among the smartest folks I've come across. But, as we've seen with Shaw and LTCM, a high I.Q. may not lead to stellar investing results. After all, LTCM's founders had among them Nobel Prize-winning economists. In the long-run, it didn't do them much good. In fact, they outsmarted themselves. In a 1999 interview with BusinessWeek, Buffett stated:
Success in investing doesn't correlate with IQ -- once you're above the level of 25. Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need is the temperament to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing.
Events at Shaw and LTCM show that high-IQ folks have a hard time sitting around contemplating their navels. The problem is that once you engage in these intellectually stimulating problems, you're almost guaranteed to find what you think are the correct answers and act upon them -- usually leading to bad results for investors.
Having observed Buffett and Munger closely over the years, and gotten into their psyche through their speeches and writings, it is clear to me that, like the folks at Shaw and LTCM, both men need enormous doses of intellectual stimulation as part of their daily diet. How do they satisfy this intellectual hunger without the accompanying actions that get investors into trouble?
Consider the following:
While Buffett plays bridge (typically 10-20 hours per week), Munger spends his time mostly on expanding his worldly wisdom and constantly improving his latticework of mental models. He is a voracious reader of intellectually engaging books on a variety of subjects, ranging from the various Ice Ages to The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. He spends considerable time in applying perspectives gained from one field of study into other disciplines -- especially capital allocation.
At the Wesco (AMEX: WSC) annual meeting this year, Munger acknowledged that the first few hundred million dollars at Berkshire came from "running a Geiger counter over everything," but the subsequent tens of billions have come from simply "waiting for the no-brainers" or, as Buffett puts it, "waiting for the phone to ring."
Buffett still has a tendency to run his Geiger counter over lots of stuff. It's just too enticing intellectually not to. How does he avoid getting into trouble? I believe there are three reasons:
1. Running the Geiger counter can work very well if one knows when to run it. Reflect on the following two quotes:
In 1970, showing his dismay at elevated stock prices, Buffett said: "I feel like a sex-starved man on a deserted island."
In 1974, expressing his glee at the low levels to which the market had fallen, he said: "I feel like a sex-starved man in a harem filled with beautiful women!"
By 1970, he had terminated his partnership and made virtually no public market investments until 1974. The P/E ratio for the S&P 500 dropped from 20 to 7 in those four years. By 1974, he had acknowledged selling "stocks he'd bought recently at 3 times earnings to buy stocks selling at 2 times earnings."
Then, from 1984-1987, Buffett did not buy a single new equity position for the Berkshire portfolio. Berkshire Hathaway was sitting on a mountain of cash, and still he did nothing. In the latter half of 1987, Berkshire used that cash pile to buy over a billion dollars' worth of Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO), over 5% of the company. He invested 25% of Berkshire Hathaway's book value in a single company that they did not control!
What were Buffett and Munger doing from 1970-1973 and 1984-1987? Both men realize that successful investing requires the patience and discipline to make big bets during the relatively infrequent intervals when the markets are undervalued, and to do "something else" during the long periods when markets are fully priced or overpriced. I'm willing to bet that Buffett was playing far more bridge in 1972 than he was in 1974.
2. The Geiger counter approach works better in smaller, under-followed companies and a host of special situations. Given their typical smaller size, investing in these companies would do nothing for Berkshire Hathaway today. So Buffett usually makes these investments for his personal portfolio. A good example is his recent investment in mortgage REIT Laser Mortgage Management (LMM), where there was a decent spread between the liquidation value and quoted stock price. These LMM-type investments are significant for Buffett's personal portfolio and, more importantly, soak up intellectual horsepower that might lead to not-so-good results at Berkshire Hathaway.
Being versatile, he moves his Geiger counter away from the equity markets to other bastions of inefficiency whenever the public markets get overheated. These include high-yield bonds (Berkshire bought over $1 billion worth of Finova bonds at deep discounts in 2001), REITs (bought First Industrial Realty in 2000 for his own portfolio at a time when REIT yields were spectacular), or his recent investing adventures in silver.
3. The Munger/Buffett relationship is an unusual one. Both men are fiercely independent thinkers, and both prefer working alone. When Buffett has an investment idea, after it makes it through his filter, he usually runs it past Munger. Munger then applies his broad latticework of mental models to find faults with Buffett's ideas, and shoots most of them down. It is the rare idea that makes it past Buffett, and it has to be a total no-brainer to make it past both of them.
The Buffett/Munger approach of multi-year periods of inactivity contrasts starkly with the frenzied activity that takes place daily at the major exchanges. Which brings me back to the fundamental question: Why have we set up portfolio managers as full-time professionals with the expectation that they "do something smart" every day? The fund management industry needs to reflect on Pascal's potent words and how Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger have figured out how to sit quietly alone in a room, indefinitely
By Mohnish Pabrai October 30, 2002
Seventeenth century French scientist Blaise Pascal is perhaps best remembered for his contributions to the field of pure geometry. In the 39 years that he lived, he found time to invent such modern day fundamentals as the syringe, the hydraulic press, and the first digital calculator. And, if that weren't enough, he was also a profound philosopher. One of my favorite Pascal quotes is: "All man's miseries derive from not being able to sit quietly in a room alone."
I've often thought that Pascal's words, slightly adapted, might apply well to a relatively new subset of humanity: "All portfolio managers' miseries derive from not being able to sit quietly in a room alone."
Why should portfolio managers sit and do nothing? And why would that be good for them? Well, let's start with the story of D.E. Shaw & Co. Founded in 1988, Shaw was staffed by some of the brightest mathematicians, computer scientists, and bond trading experts on the planet. Jeff Bezos worked at Shaw before embarking on his Amazon.com (Nasdaq: AMZN) journey. These folks found that there was a lot of money to be made with risk-free arbitrage in the bond markets with some highly sophisticated bond arbitrage trading algorithms.
Shaw was able to capitalize on minuscule short-term inefficiencies in the bond markets with highly leveraged capital. The annualized returns were nothing short of spectacular -- and all of it risk-free! The bright folks at Shaw put their trading on autopilot, with minimal human tweaking required. They came to work and mostly played pool or video games or just goofed off. Shaw's profit per employee was astronomical, and everyone was happy with this Utopian arrangement.
Eventually, the nerds got fidgety -- they wanted to do something. They felt that they had only scratched the surface and, if they only dug deeper, there would be more gold to be mined. And so they fiddled with the system to try to juice returns.
What followed was a similar path taken by Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a fund once considered so big and so smart on Wall Street that it simply could not fail. And yet, when economic events that did not conform to its historical model took place in rapid succession, it nearly did just that. There was a gradual movement from pure risk-free arbitrage to playing the risky arbitrage game in the equity markets. A lot more capital could be deployed, and the returns looked appealing. With no guaranteed short-term convergence and highly leveraged positions, the eventual result was a blow-up that nearly wiped out the firm.
Compared to nearly any other discipline, I find that fund management is, in many respects, a bizarre field --where hard work and intellect don't necessarily lead to satisfactory results. As Warren Buffett succinctly put it during the 1998 Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A) annual meeting: "We don't get paid for activity, just for being right. As to how long we'll wait, we'll wait indefinitely!"
Buffett and his business partner Charlie Munger are easily among the smartest folks I've come across. But, as we've seen with Shaw and LTCM, a high I.Q. may not lead to stellar investing results. After all, LTCM's founders had among them Nobel Prize-winning economists. In the long-run, it didn't do them much good. In fact, they outsmarted themselves. In a 1999 interview with BusinessWeek, Buffett stated:
Success in investing doesn't correlate with IQ -- once you're above the level of 25. Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need is the temperament to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing.
Events at Shaw and LTCM show that high-IQ folks have a hard time sitting around contemplating their navels. The problem is that once you engage in these intellectually stimulating problems, you're almost guaranteed to find what you think are the correct answers and act upon them -- usually leading to bad results for investors.
Having observed Buffett and Munger closely over the years, and gotten into their psyche through their speeches and writings, it is clear to me that, like the folks at Shaw and LTCM, both men need enormous doses of intellectual stimulation as part of their daily diet. How do they satisfy this intellectual hunger without the accompanying actions that get investors into trouble?
Consider the following:
While Buffett plays bridge (typically 10-20 hours per week), Munger spends his time mostly on expanding his worldly wisdom and constantly improving his latticework of mental models. He is a voracious reader of intellectually engaging books on a variety of subjects, ranging from the various Ice Ages to The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. He spends considerable time in applying perspectives gained from one field of study into other disciplines -- especially capital allocation.
At the Wesco (AMEX: WSC) annual meeting this year, Munger acknowledged that the first few hundred million dollars at Berkshire came from "running a Geiger counter over everything," but the subsequent tens of billions have come from simply "waiting for the no-brainers" or, as Buffett puts it, "waiting for the phone to ring."
Buffett still has a tendency to run his Geiger counter over lots of stuff. It's just too enticing intellectually not to. How does he avoid getting into trouble? I believe there are three reasons:
1. Running the Geiger counter can work very well if one knows when to run it. Reflect on the following two quotes:
In 1970, showing his dismay at elevated stock prices, Buffett said: "I feel like a sex-starved man on a deserted island."
In 1974, expressing his glee at the low levels to which the market had fallen, he said: "I feel like a sex-starved man in a harem filled with beautiful women!"
By 1970, he had terminated his partnership and made virtually no public market investments until 1974. The P/E ratio for the S&P 500 dropped from 20 to 7 in those four years. By 1974, he had acknowledged selling "stocks he'd bought recently at 3 times earnings to buy stocks selling at 2 times earnings."
Then, from 1984-1987, Buffett did not buy a single new equity position for the Berkshire portfolio. Berkshire Hathaway was sitting on a mountain of cash, and still he did nothing. In the latter half of 1987, Berkshire used that cash pile to buy over a billion dollars' worth of Coca-Cola (NYSE: KO), over 5% of the company. He invested 25% of Berkshire Hathaway's book value in a single company that they did not control!
What were Buffett and Munger doing from 1970-1973 and 1984-1987? Both men realize that successful investing requires the patience and discipline to make big bets during the relatively infrequent intervals when the markets are undervalued, and to do "something else" during the long periods when markets are fully priced or overpriced. I'm willing to bet that Buffett was playing far more bridge in 1972 than he was in 1974.
2. The Geiger counter approach works better in smaller, under-followed companies and a host of special situations. Given their typical smaller size, investing in these companies would do nothing for Berkshire Hathaway today. So Buffett usually makes these investments for his personal portfolio. A good example is his recent investment in mortgage REIT Laser Mortgage Management (LMM), where there was a decent spread between the liquidation value and quoted stock price. These LMM-type investments are significant for Buffett's personal portfolio and, more importantly, soak up intellectual horsepower that might lead to not-so-good results at Berkshire Hathaway.
Being versatile, he moves his Geiger counter away from the equity markets to other bastions of inefficiency whenever the public markets get overheated. These include high-yield bonds (Berkshire bought over $1 billion worth of Finova bonds at deep discounts in 2001), REITs (bought First Industrial Realty in 2000 for his own portfolio at a time when REIT yields were spectacular), or his recent investing adventures in silver.
3. The Munger/Buffett relationship is an unusual one. Both men are fiercely independent thinkers, and both prefer working alone. When Buffett has an investment idea, after it makes it through his filter, he usually runs it past Munger. Munger then applies his broad latticework of mental models to find faults with Buffett's ideas, and shoots most of them down. It is the rare idea that makes it past Buffett, and it has to be a total no-brainer to make it past both of them.
The Buffett/Munger approach of multi-year periods of inactivity contrasts starkly with the frenzied activity that takes place daily at the major exchanges. Which brings me back to the fundamental question: Why have we set up portfolio managers as full-time professionals with the expectation that they "do something smart" every day? The fund management industry needs to reflect on Pascal's potent words and how Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger have figured out how to sit quietly alone in a room, indefinitely
Saturday, October 15, 2005
ASIAN STOCK FOCUS: India Bharti Tele's Surge To Continue
By Santanu Choudhury
Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
NEW DELHI (Dow Jones)-- Bharti Tele-Ventures Ltd. (532454.BY) is
overpriced by most measures and yet the stock of India's largest mobile
phone operator is likely to post further gains as analysts prepare to
raise their price targets.
The stock has surged 36% since the start of the year and trades at value
three times that of its regional peers based on its price to earnings
ratio, driven by robust growth in subscriber numbers and the company's
healthy earnings.
But being India's only private operator covering all the 23
telecommunications "circles" or zones into which the country is divided
and the only listed mobile services provider, gives the company unique
status in a hot market, justifying its premium, analysts say.
Although competition is heating up in the fast-growing telecom sector,
Bharti's forays into under-exploited rural areas and its innovative
value-added services, such as text messaging linked to TV programs, will
offset any fall in average revenue per user due to falling tariffs, say
analysts.
"I am looking at a 10%-15% upside over my 12-month price target of INR273
($6.2)," said Priyanko Panja, telecom analyst at Edelweiss Capital.
The company has long been a favorite of foreign investors. Singapore
Telecommunications Ltd. (T48.SG) owns 30.84% of the company. Warburg
Pincus LLC (WBP.XX) has a 5.74% stake. Total foreign institutional holding
stands at nearly 25%.
Bharti closed at INR310.50 Friday, 36% higher than its price of INR227.85
on Jan. 3, outstripping the benchmark Sensex which has gained 15% in the
same period.
At the current price, Bharti has a market capitalization of INR588 billion
and a price-to-earnings ratio of 40.85 times, well above that of its
regional peers, such as SingTel which has a P/E ratio of about 15 times
its projected 2005-06 earnings.
Still, Vikash Mantri, who handles telecom securities research in SBI
Capital Markets, says Bharti's valuation is attractive, given its
prospects and the scope of the market.
Citigroup, in a recent note to clients, said: "Though competitive
pressure...remains intense with five large nationwide and some regional
players, we believe there is a shift toward profitability from pure
subscriber additions."
Citigroup, which has a buy rating on the stock, has raised its 12-month
price target by 54% to INR400.
Morgan Stanley has an overweight rating and recently revised upward its
12-month price target to INR375 from INR304.
"Our revised earnings estimates and price target are based on higher
wireless subscribers and average revenue per user, long-distance
contribution and lower tax outflow assumptions," Morgan Stanley said in
its mid-August report.
In July, Bharti added 533,218 subscribers, the most of the nine GSM-based
operators, after it introduced cheaper prepaid cards of INR200 each, which
proved popular in the smaller cities and towns. The company had 12.79
million subscribers by the end of the month.
By comparison, unlisted Reliance Infocomm, the second-largest mobile
operator offering both GSM and code division multiple access-based mobile
services, had 12 million subscribers.
Bharti also provides fixed-line and broadband services in 14 zones in
India and has over 970,000 customers in this segment.
For the first quarter ended June 30, the company reported a net profit of
INR5.10 billion, 70% higher than INR2.96 billion a year ago.
Revenue for the quarter grew 48% on year to INR25.17 billion from INR17.05
billion.
However, average revenue per user in the mobile segment fell to INR493
from INR515 in the year-ago quarter, a result of the company trying to tap
low-end users and falling tariffs.
Morgan Stanley says Bharti will be able to mitigate the impact of lower
revenue per user in the voice segment by increasing revenue from SMS,
especially those related to television programs that cost four-to-six
times more than a standard SMS.
It estimates the company's net profit will grow 53% every year till fiscal
2007-08. Earnings before interest and tax are expected to rise 40% in the
period.
User Base To More Than Double By 2007
Like its peers, Bharti has benefited from falling handset prices and
growing incomes in India, where just one in 10 people out of a billion
plus population has a phone.
With nearly 2.5 million subscribers being added every month, India has
emerged as one of the fastest growing telecom markets in the world.
The Indian government has forecast the country will have 250 million
telephones by December 2007, up from over 100 million now. Of the current
total, 59 million are mobile phones users.
Bharti, which is the leader in the GSM segment with over a 27% market
share, stands to gain the most from any growth in the market considering
its pan-Indian presence, say analysts.
Mantri of SBI Capital Markets rates Bharti a marketperformer. He expects
the company to have a subscriber base of 22 million by fiscal 2006-07 as
availability and affordability of mobile phone services increase.
He forecasts India's mobile phone subscriber base to grow threefold to 150
million by 2008.
According to IDC Asia/Pacific, a Singapore-based telecom and IT research
firm, mobile services revenue in India is expected to more than triple to
S$12.5 billion in 2009 from S$3.7 billion in 2004.
Bharti recently signed a $125 million contract with Finnish
telecommunications company Nokia Corp. (NOK) to expand its network
capacity and cover over 5,000 towns and villages across India.
The company plans to spend $1 billion during the current fiscal year to
March 2006 to extend its coverage to 2,200 more towns. It is now present
in 2,800 towns. The money will also be used to introduce fixed-line and
broadband connections in several major cities in the country.
However, some factors could hurt Bharti's performance, say analysts.
Mantri says although India's telecom tariffs are among the lowest in the
world at 2-3 cents per minute, mobile phones still remain out of reach for
many people.
He says costs would have to go down significantly for any substantial
addition to subscriber numbers.
Also, with taxes and other levies accounting for 40% of the total tariff,
operators such as Bharti are dependent on the government to lower such
taxes before they are able to cut charges and improve volume, say
analysts.
Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
NEW DELHI (Dow Jones)-- Bharti Tele-Ventures Ltd. (532454.BY) is
overpriced by most measures and yet the stock of India's largest mobile
phone operator is likely to post further gains as analysts prepare to
raise their price targets.
The stock has surged 36% since the start of the year and trades at value
three times that of its regional peers based on its price to earnings
ratio, driven by robust growth in subscriber numbers and the company's
healthy earnings.
But being India's only private operator covering all the 23
telecommunications "circles" or zones into which the country is divided
and the only listed mobile services provider, gives the company unique
status in a hot market, justifying its premium, analysts say.
Although competition is heating up in the fast-growing telecom sector,
Bharti's forays into under-exploited rural areas and its innovative
value-added services, such as text messaging linked to TV programs, will
offset any fall in average revenue per user due to falling tariffs, say
analysts.
"I am looking at a 10%-15% upside over my 12-month price target of INR273
($6.2)," said Priyanko Panja, telecom analyst at Edelweiss Capital.
The company has long been a favorite of foreign investors. Singapore
Telecommunications Ltd. (T48.SG) owns 30.84% of the company. Warburg
Pincus LLC (WBP.XX) has a 5.74% stake. Total foreign institutional holding
stands at nearly 25%.
Bharti closed at INR310.50 Friday, 36% higher than its price of INR227.85
on Jan. 3, outstripping the benchmark Sensex which has gained 15% in the
same period.
At the current price, Bharti has a market capitalization of INR588 billion
and a price-to-earnings ratio of 40.85 times, well above that of its
regional peers, such as SingTel which has a P/E ratio of about 15 times
its projected 2005-06 earnings.
Still, Vikash Mantri, who handles telecom securities research in SBI
Capital Markets, says Bharti's valuation is attractive, given its
prospects and the scope of the market.
Citigroup, in a recent note to clients, said: "Though competitive
pressure...remains intense with five large nationwide and some regional
players, we believe there is a shift toward profitability from pure
subscriber additions."
Citigroup, which has a buy rating on the stock, has raised its 12-month
price target by 54% to INR400.
Morgan Stanley has an overweight rating and recently revised upward its
12-month price target to INR375 from INR304.
"Our revised earnings estimates and price target are based on higher
wireless subscribers and average revenue per user, long-distance
contribution and lower tax outflow assumptions," Morgan Stanley said in
its mid-August report.
In July, Bharti added 533,218 subscribers, the most of the nine GSM-based
operators, after it introduced cheaper prepaid cards of INR200 each, which
proved popular in the smaller cities and towns. The company had 12.79
million subscribers by the end of the month.
By comparison, unlisted Reliance Infocomm, the second-largest mobile
operator offering both GSM and code division multiple access-based mobile
services, had 12 million subscribers.
Bharti also provides fixed-line and broadband services in 14 zones in
India and has over 970,000 customers in this segment.
For the first quarter ended June 30, the company reported a net profit of
INR5.10 billion, 70% higher than INR2.96 billion a year ago.
Revenue for the quarter grew 48% on year to INR25.17 billion from INR17.05
billion.
However, average revenue per user in the mobile segment fell to INR493
from INR515 in the year-ago quarter, a result of the company trying to tap
low-end users and falling tariffs.
Morgan Stanley says Bharti will be able to mitigate the impact of lower
revenue per user in the voice segment by increasing revenue from SMS,
especially those related to television programs that cost four-to-six
times more than a standard SMS.
It estimates the company's net profit will grow 53% every year till fiscal
2007-08. Earnings before interest and tax are expected to rise 40% in the
period.
User Base To More Than Double By 2007
Like its peers, Bharti has benefited from falling handset prices and
growing incomes in India, where just one in 10 people out of a billion
plus population has a phone.
With nearly 2.5 million subscribers being added every month, India has
emerged as one of the fastest growing telecom markets in the world.
The Indian government has forecast the country will have 250 million
telephones by December 2007, up from over 100 million now. Of the current
total, 59 million are mobile phones users.
Bharti, which is the leader in the GSM segment with over a 27% market
share, stands to gain the most from any growth in the market considering
its pan-Indian presence, say analysts.
Mantri of SBI Capital Markets rates Bharti a marketperformer. He expects
the company to have a subscriber base of 22 million by fiscal 2006-07 as
availability and affordability of mobile phone services increase.
He forecasts India's mobile phone subscriber base to grow threefold to 150
million by 2008.
According to IDC Asia/Pacific, a Singapore-based telecom and IT research
firm, mobile services revenue in India is expected to more than triple to
S$12.5 billion in 2009 from S$3.7 billion in 2004.
Bharti recently signed a $125 million contract with Finnish
telecommunications company Nokia Corp. (NOK) to expand its network
capacity and cover over 5,000 towns and villages across India.
The company plans to spend $1 billion during the current fiscal year to
March 2006 to extend its coverage to 2,200 more towns. It is now present
in 2,800 towns. The money will also be used to introduce fixed-line and
broadband connections in several major cities in the country.
However, some factors could hurt Bharti's performance, say analysts.
Mantri says although India's telecom tariffs are among the lowest in the
world at 2-3 cents per minute, mobile phones still remain out of reach for
many people.
He says costs would have to go down significantly for any substantial
addition to subscriber numbers.
Also, with taxes and other levies accounting for 40% of the total tariff,
operators such as Bharti are dependent on the government to lower such
taxes before they are able to cut charges and improve volume, say
analysts.
Broker Poll: Offload Bharti Tele partially
With the Bharti Televentures stock touching a lifetime high of Rs 302.10 on August 5, 2005, Moneycontrol decided to speak to a couple of experts about the stock’s future and came out with two divergent views.
2005-08-09 16:45
The Bharti Televentures stock is buzzing from the day Warburg Pincus offloaded 9% stake in two separate tranches in February and March this year at around Rs 217-218 levels. Following a slew of initiatives like outsourcing of telecom equipment deal from Ericsson and call center operations to a number of established players coupled with solid earnings numbers reported for the first quarter of the current fiscal year, the stock hit a lifetime high of Rs 302.10 on August 5, 2005, stock and is currently hovering at Rs 294 levels.
What’s more, in the last one year, the stock has almost doubled from a low of Rs 150.30 posted on August 5, 2004 to close at Rs 292.85 on August 5 this year clocking gains of almost 95%. With this in mind, Moneycontrol asked a couple of analysts if the stock has some upside left.
Interestingly, the two analysts Moneycontrol spoke with had divergent views.
Investors should sell at least 50% of their holdings and log onto the gains that they have made since last year, says Vikash Mantri of SBI Capital Markets. He is confident that investors will get a chance again to enter the stocks at lower levels.
Even as the growth story in the telecom sector is still intact it has been accounted into current prices, he argues. And he backs his analysis with hard numbers.
At last year’s trailing EPS of Rs 7.5, Bharti trades at a PE multiple of 35 times. He says that for FY-06 the company is likely to increase its EPS to Rs 13.3 and even at that level the stock would trade at a PE ratio of 22, which is far higher than global companies in the telecom sector. And hence investors should book half their profits and enter again at lower levels.
Ambarish Baliga of Karvy Stockbroking, however, has a complete contrarian view on the stock. He says that the stock can reach a target level of Rs 320-325 in the next four months and feels that investors who are sitting on gains should quit the stock at that level.
“This is not a momentum call I am taking. Based on the stock’s fundamentals it can reach Rs 320-325 levels in four to five months time,” he avers.
One aspect that both the analysts concur on is the ability of the management to perform in the face of stiff competition from established players.
Mantri is very impressed with the Bharti management’s “continuous efforts to outsource its needs from companies which are best at it.” A case in point is Bharti’s decision to outsource its call center operations to IBM Daksh, Mphasis, Hinduja TMT and Teletech. The deal, worth Rs 1000 crore spread over next five years, is likely to add to Bharti’s bottomline. “But when this will happen is difficult to gauge.” The cost-benefit ratio of this outsourcing deal will surely benefit Bharti’s bottomline is his confident analyses.
Baliga, too, gives thumbs up to Bharti’s management in building a pan-India footprint amidst stiff competition. “Not all companies in the GSM space could do that despite having a first movers advantage. The company will benefit from this as it has ramped up a good subscriber base despite competition from established players like Essar-Hutch combine and BPL.”
However, Baliga is of the opinion that Bharti may not benefit from the outsourcing of call center operations to companies engaged in these functions.
On the flip side, Mantri adds that the hotting up of competition in the GSM space after Essar-Hutch combine’s takeover of BPL’s GSM operations are likely to impact operating profit margins of all telecom companies, including Bharti's.
“One must keep in mind that Bharti has done exceedingly well despite competition from established players in the telecom sector. In terms of subscriber addition and value added services, they are squaring up nicely with the competition which has led to their net profit zooming to Rs 461.72 crore for the first quarter of this fiscal compared to loss of Rs 13.96 crore for Q4-05. Bharti’s management must be given credit for that,” is his parting shot.
By Prasanna Zore
2005-08-09 16:45
The Bharti Televentures stock is buzzing from the day Warburg Pincus offloaded 9% stake in two separate tranches in February and March this year at around Rs 217-218 levels. Following a slew of initiatives like outsourcing of telecom equipment deal from Ericsson and call center operations to a number of established players coupled with solid earnings numbers reported for the first quarter of the current fiscal year, the stock hit a lifetime high of Rs 302.10 on August 5, 2005, stock and is currently hovering at Rs 294 levels.
What’s more, in the last one year, the stock has almost doubled from a low of Rs 150.30 posted on August 5, 2004 to close at Rs 292.85 on August 5 this year clocking gains of almost 95%. With this in mind, Moneycontrol asked a couple of analysts if the stock has some upside left.
Interestingly, the two analysts Moneycontrol spoke with had divergent views.
Investors should sell at least 50% of their holdings and log onto the gains that they have made since last year, says Vikash Mantri of SBI Capital Markets. He is confident that investors will get a chance again to enter the stocks at lower levels.
Even as the growth story in the telecom sector is still intact it has been accounted into current prices, he argues. And he backs his analysis with hard numbers.
At last year’s trailing EPS of Rs 7.5, Bharti trades at a PE multiple of 35 times. He says that for FY-06 the company is likely to increase its EPS to Rs 13.3 and even at that level the stock would trade at a PE ratio of 22, which is far higher than global companies in the telecom sector. And hence investors should book half their profits and enter again at lower levels.
Ambarish Baliga of Karvy Stockbroking, however, has a complete contrarian view on the stock. He says that the stock can reach a target level of Rs 320-325 in the next four months and feels that investors who are sitting on gains should quit the stock at that level.
“This is not a momentum call I am taking. Based on the stock’s fundamentals it can reach Rs 320-325 levels in four to five months time,” he avers.
One aspect that both the analysts concur on is the ability of the management to perform in the face of stiff competition from established players.
Mantri is very impressed with the Bharti management’s “continuous efforts to outsource its needs from companies which are best at it.” A case in point is Bharti’s decision to outsource its call center operations to IBM Daksh, Mphasis, Hinduja TMT and Teletech. The deal, worth Rs 1000 crore spread over next five years, is likely to add to Bharti’s bottomline. “But when this will happen is difficult to gauge.” The cost-benefit ratio of this outsourcing deal will surely benefit Bharti’s bottomline is his confident analyses.
Baliga, too, gives thumbs up to Bharti’s management in building a pan-India footprint amidst stiff competition. “Not all companies in the GSM space could do that despite having a first movers advantage. The company will benefit from this as it has ramped up a good subscriber base despite competition from established players like Essar-Hutch combine and BPL.”
However, Baliga is of the opinion that Bharti may not benefit from the outsourcing of call center operations to companies engaged in these functions.
On the flip side, Mantri adds that the hotting up of competition in the GSM space after Essar-Hutch combine’s takeover of BPL’s GSM operations are likely to impact operating profit margins of all telecom companies, including Bharti's.
“One must keep in mind that Bharti has done exceedingly well despite competition from established players in the telecom sector. In terms of subscriber addition and value added services, they are squaring up nicely with the competition which has led to their net profit zooming to Rs 461.72 crore for the first quarter of this fiscal compared to loss of Rs 13.96 crore for Q4-05. Bharti’s management must be given credit for that,” is his parting shot.
By Prasanna Zore
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